For more than a century, the United States has restricted Tribal governments’ powers over criminal law. It has diminished Tribal jurisdiction and imposed adversarial approaches on Tribal courts. But recently, some Tribal courts have begun to embrace Indigenous-based restorative justice models. UCLA School of Law Assistant Professor Lauren van Schilfgaarde discusses how these models are strengthening both Tribal courts and Tribal jurisdiction more broadly. Author: Lauren van Schilfgaarde, Assistant Professor, UCLA School of Law Host: Peter Mason (Volume 113 Podcast Editor) Script: Peter Mason (Volume 113 Podcast Editor) Technology Editors: Georgiana Soo (Volume 112 Podcast Editor), Sandeep Stanley (Volume 113 Senior Technology Editor), Emily C. Welsch (Volume 113 Technology Editor) Soundtrack: Composed and performed by Carter Jansen (Volume 110 Technology Editor)

Each year, Child Protective Services investigates over one million families. Every investigation includes a room-by-room search of the family home, as well as the threat of the state’s coercive authority to remove children from their families. CUNY School of Law Professor Tarek Z. Ismail discusses how these investigations have evaded traditional Fourth Amendment scrutiny. Author: Tarek Z. Ismail, Associate Professor, CUNY School of Law Host: Georgiana Soo (Volume 112 Podcast Editor) Script: Peter Mason (Volume 112 Associate Editor) Technology Editors: Georgiana Soo (Volume 112 Podcast Editor, Al Malecha (Volume 112 Senior Technology Editor, Kiana Harkema (Volume 112 Technology Editor) Soundtrack: Composed and performed by Carter Jansen (Volume 110 Technology Editor)

Americans have long persevered in the face of the national welfare system’s inadequacies. But when a new challenge in the form of climate change emerges, how can the United States adapt its welfare programs to assist Americans? Author: Andrew Hammond, Professor of Law, Indiana University Maurer School of Law Host: Georgiana Soo (Volume 112 Podcast Editor) Technology Editors: Georgiana Soo (Volume 112 Podcast Editor, Al Malecha (Volume 112 Senior Technology Editor, Kiana Harkema (Volume 112 Technology Editor) Soundtrack: Composed and performed by Carter Jansen (Volume 110 Technology Editor) Note Abstract: In the United States, law condemns poor people to their fates in states. Where Americans live continues to dictate whether they can access cash, food, and medical assistance. What’s more, immigrants, territorial residents, and tribal members encounter deteriorated corners of the American welfare state. Nonetheless, despite repeated retrenchment efforts, this patchwork of programs has proven remarkably resilient. Yet, the ability of the United States to meet its people’s most basic needs now faces an unprecedented challenge: climate change. As extreme weather events like wildfires and hurricanes become more frequent and more intense, these climate-fueled disasters will displace and impoverish more people. How can the United States adapt its welfare programs to assist Americans in the face of this threat? This Article maps that uncharted territory. It contextualizes the climate crisis in our scholarly understanding of the U.S. welfare state. It then canvasses the myriad disaster provisions in each major welfare program. Equipped with an understanding of the status quo, the Article proceeds to evaluate how federal law has fared amid the recent spate of fires and floods. The Article attends to the role of Congress, weakened as it is by increased polarization and diminished capacity, and how the resulting delays and distortions in emergency relief have hampered the governmental response. The Article then brings state government into focus, and in doing so, demonstrates how assistance often excludes the most vulnerable Americans. The Article also extracts lessons from the pandemic response and applies them to climate adaptation of public benefits. The Article concludes with an agenda for how to adapt welfare programs to meet the climate crisis. That agenda starts and ends with the federal government, but it includes policies states, territories, and Tribes could implement if Congress and federal agencies do nothing or not enough. The Article repurposes what we know about how the U.S. welfare state functions now to inform what government should do next.

Consumer law practitioners and scholars have long argued that credit scores perpetuate historical social discrimination along lines of race, class, and gender. But what happens when abusers weaponize this financial tool—and the structural inequities baked into it—and coerce debt from their partners? And what does a new California statute created to rectify such coercion actually do? Author: Michaela Park, 3L at UC Berkeley School of Law Host: Kevin Kallet (Volume 112 Associate Editor) Technology Editors: Georgiana Soo (Volume 112 Podcast Editor), Al Malecha (Volume 112 Senior Technology Editor), Kiana Harkema (Volume 112 Technology Editor) Soundtrack: Composed and performed by Carter Jansen (Volume 110 Technology Editor) Note Abstract: A new form of domestic violence has emerged out of the modern proliferation of consumer lending: coerced debt. Although abusers use a wide range of tactics to coerce debt—from identity theft to forcing or tricking partners to sign loan documents—coerced debt invariably damages survivors’ credit scores, creating barriers to financial stability for which existing remedies provide little relief. This note examines California Family Code Section 6342.5, a new amendment that allows survivors to request an order stating they are not responsible for debts coerced by their abuser. Survivors will then be able to use this order in conjunction with state identity theft laws to protect themselves from creditors. This note argues that, while its passage signals lawmakers are making efforts to provide victims of coerced debt with corresponding relief, Family Code Section 6342.5 may ultimately be ineffectual in the face of modern credit granting and debt collection practices and California’s own identity theft laws. California legislators must pass further legislation that recognizes the role of the credit system itself in facilitating coerced debt. Ultimately, coerced debt puts into stark relief the growing consequences of our increasingly automated and depersonalized credit system for survivors of domestic violence.

“What does it mean to be a lawyer committed to justice when the law seemingly facilitates injustice? And how do you teach students to reckon with this question?” Author: Etienne C. Toussaint, Assistant Professor of Law, University of South Carolina School of Law Host: Kevin Kallet (Volume 112 Associate Editor) Technology Editors: Hiep Nguyen (Volume 111 Senior Technology Editor), Taylor Graham (Volume 111 Podcast Editor), Benji Martinez (Volume 111 Technology Editor) Soundtrack: Composed and performed by Carter Jansen (Volume 110 Technology Editor) Article Abstract: When President Donald Trump launched an assault on diversity training, critical race theory, and The 1619 Project in September 2020 as “divisive, un-American propaganda,” many law students were presumably confused. After all, law school has historically been doctrinally neutral, racially homogenous, and socially hierarchical. In most core law school courses, colorblindness and objectivity trump critical legal discourse on issues of race, gender, or sexuality. Yet, such disorientation reflects a longstanding debate over the fundamental purpose of law school. As U.S. law schools develop anti-racist curricula and expand their experiential learning programs to produce so-called practice-ready lawyers for the crises exposed by the COVID-19 pandemic, scholars continue to question whether and how, if at all, the purpose of law school converges with societal efforts to reckon with America’s legacy of White supremacy. This Article argues that the anti-racist, democratic, and movement lawyering principles advocated by progressive legal scholars should not be viewed merely as aspirational ideals for social justice law courses. Rather, querying whether legal systems and political institutions further racism, economic oppression, or social injustice must be viewed as endemic to the fundamental purpose of legal education. In so doing, this Article makes three important contributions to the literature on legal education and philosophical legal ethics. First, it clarifies how two ideologies—functionalism and neoliberalism—have threatened to drift law school’s historic public purpose away from the democratic norms of public citizenship, inflicting law students, law faculty, and the legal academy with an existential identity crisis. Second, it explores historical mechanisms of institutional change within law schools that reveal diverse notions of law school’s purpose as historically contingent. Such perspectives are shaped by the behaviors, cultural attitudes, and ideological beliefs of law faculty operating within particular social, political, and economic contexts. Third, and finally, it demonstrates the urgency of moving beyond liberal legalism in legal education by integrating critical legal theories and movement law principles throughout the entire law school curriculum.

Although the Twenty Fourth Amendment has received little attention since its ratification, the Amendment may provide a basis for combatting unconstitutional voter reenfranchisement schemes that condition the right to vote on money payments to the government. Author: Elizabeth Heckmann, 2022 Graduate of the University of California, Berkeley, School of Law Host: Taylor Graham Technology Editors: Hiep Nguyen (Volume 111 Senior Technology Editor), Taylor Graham (Volume 111 Technology Editor), Benji Martinez (Volume 111 Technology Editor) Soundtrack: Composed and performed by Carter Jansen (Volume 110 Technology Editor) Article Abstract: The Twenty-Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution has received little attention from federal courts since its ratification. The Amendment’s language is broad and far-ranging, prohibiting conditioning the right to vote on payment of poll taxes or “any other” tax. Although the Amendment’s text, its legislative history, and early Supreme Court decisions strongly indicate that the law’s drafters intended to eliminate any and all wealth-based qualifications on voting, many states continue to require people convicted of felonies to pay money to the government before regaining their right to vote. Some litigators have used the Amendment to combat felon re-enfranchisement schemes that unconstitutionally condition access to the ballot box on payment of legal financial obligations (LFOs) associated with the person’s criminal sentence. Most recently, the Eleventh Circuit addressed Florida voters’ challenge to the Florida Senate’s interpretation of Amendment 4, which automatically re-enfranchised people convicted of felonies when they completed “all terms of [their] sentence,” including LFOs. This Note explores the lower court’s and Eleventh Circuit’s analyses of the Twenty-Fourth Amendment, as well as challenges and solutions to using the Amendment in the future to combat unconstitutional re-enfranchisement schemes conditioning the right to vote on a money payment to the government. Part I discusses the history of felon disenfranchisement and the Twenty-Fourth Amendment, as well as major Supreme Court decisions applying the Amendment to voting laws. Part II analyzes the line of Federal District Court and Eleventh Circuit decisions addressing Florida’s Amendment 4 and whether requiring people convicted of felonies to pay all LFOs before regaining the right to vote violates the Twenty-Fourth Amendment. Part III explores why the Eleventh Circuit’s ruling is not in line with the Amendment’s text and history, nor with the Supreme Court’s Twenty-Fourth Amendment or tax jurisprudence.

When employers commit wage violations against their low-wage employees, recovery of those funds through a lawsuit or the administrative process is difficult and time consuming. No matter the outcome of the litigation, the result is a transfer of wealth from the victims of wage theft to the perpetrators. But what if there was a to ensure employees were paid up front for their lost wages? Author: Elizabeth Ford, Visiting Professor, Seattle University School of Law Host: Taylor Graham Technology Editors: Hiep Nguyen (Volume 111 Senior Technology Editor), Taylor Graham (Volume 111 Technology Editor), Benji Martinez (Volume 111 Technology Editor) Soundtrack: Composed and performed by Carter Jansen (Volume 110 Technology Editor) Article Abstract: Wage theft is rampant in the United States. It occurs so frequently because employers have much more power than workers. Worse, our main tool for preventing and remedying wage theft—charging government agencies with enforcing the law—has largely failed to mitigate this power differential. Enforcement agencies, overburdened by the magnitude of the wage theft crisis, often settle cases for nothing more than wages owed. The agency, acting as broker for the payment of the wages owed, voluntarily foregoes both interest and statutory penalties. This is a bad deal for workers, but not just because they do not get the benefit of the interest or penalties. Instead of making workers who have experienced wage theft whole, the enforcement agencies systematically broker no-interest loans from low-wage workers to their employers. The system, as it functions now, essentially transfers wealth from low wage workers to their employers. This is not the result of malicious intent: when forced to choose between recovering wages-only or waiting another six months for a still-uncertain recovery, workers themselves will choose the former. This Article proposes an elegant solution that will shift this paradigm: Wage Recovery Funds (WRFs). A WRF is a pool of funds housed at a government agency or community organization. Employees who are victims of wage theft could approach the WRF; if the WRF accepts the case, it would make the worker whole upfront—before the employer has paid—and then take assignment of the worker’s claim. The WRF would then pursue wages, interest, and penalties through administrative enforcement proceedings. Money recovered from employers would then be returned to the fund to support the next case. Beyond aggregating interest and penalties for support of future workers, a Wage Recovery Fund would change the risk paradigm, placing the risk of delayed recovery on an entity that can more easily afford it, and eliminating the workers’ immediate need for lost wages as a source of employer leverage in settlement.

In the United States, many recently decarcerated individuals struggle to find housing. The coronavirus pandemic forced a national conversation about this issue and highlighted how essential the right to housing is to prison abolition efforts. Author: Norrinda Brown Hayat, Associate Professor of Law, Rutgers Law School Host: Taylor Graham Technology Editors: Hiep Nguyen (Volume 111 Senior Technology Editor), Taylor Graham (Volume 111 Technology Editor), Benji Martinez (Volume 111 Technology Editor) Soundtrack: Composed and performed by Carter Jansen (Volume 110 Technology Editor) Article Abstract: The coronavirus pandemic revealed the need to advance the right to housing and abolition movements. The need for advancements in both spaces was no more painfully apparent than among the recently decarcerated population. Securing housing for the recently decarcerated is particularly difficult due to the “culture of exclusion” that has long pervaded subsidized housing policy, enabled by a patchwork of federal laws, including the Anti-Drug Abuse Act (ADA) of 1988 and the Supreme Court’s ruling in HUD v. Rucker. The culture of exclusion is arbitrated by local housing authorities and works on three levels: eligibility, enforcement, and set asides. As a result, formerly incarcerated persons are often rejected outright during the application process. In addition, persons living in subsidized housing can be evicted for merely associating with the recently decarcerated. This Article seeks to motivate a pathway toward housing the decarcerated by ending the culture of exclusion. In Part I, the Article updates the status of the prison abolition and right to housing movements and argues why they are interdependent. Part II builds on the idea that stable housing for formerly incarcerated persons is essential to the prison abolition movement’s success by reviewing pilot programs. Part III suggests that “one strike” policies have created a broader “culture of exclusion,” which the Supreme Court validated in Rucker, further burdening the reentry process for the recently decarcerated. Finally, Part IV prescribes policy changes that are essential to housing the decarcerated beyond repealing the ADA and overturning Rucker, including transcending the narrative of innocence, directing public housing authority discretion, and equalizing voucher holders through civil rights laws.

All first-year law students take contracts, where they learn about offer and acceptance and what makes a legally enforceable agreement. But what can contract theory tell us about police violence against black people in the United States? Author: Marissa Jackson Sow, Assistant Professor of Law, University of Richmond School of Law Host: Taylor Graham Technology Editors: Hiep Nguyen (Volume 111 Senior Technology Editor), Taylor Graham (Volume 111 Technology Editor), Benji Martinez (Volume 111 Technology Editor) Soundtrack: Composed and performed by Carter Jansen (Volume 110 Technology Editor) Article Abstract: There exists a substantial body of literature on racism and brutality in policing, police reform and abolition, the militarization of the police, and the relationship of the police to the State and its citizenry. Many theories abound with respect to the relationship between the police and Black people in the United States, and most of these theories rest upon the basic assumption—undergirded by constitutional, civil rights, and human rights law—that Black people in the United States are entitled to due process and equal protection when they are in contact with the police or other law enforcement officers. This Article uses critical contract theory and the theory of Whiteness as Contract to challenge that basic assumption and instead advance the claim that the mandate that police “protect and serve” does not apply to Black people, notwithstanding the provisions of constitutional and statutory law, because Black people are the objects of racial contracting rather than participants therein. The police are charged with protecting the racial contract and serving the contract’s signatories; accordingly, they enforce the contract’s terms, requiring them to specifically target Black people for surveillance, harassment, deprivation, and even death, lest the contract be subject to breach or other interference.

Author: Hiep Nguyen is a third-year student at the University of California, Berkeley School of Law Host: Taylor Graham Technology Editors: Hiep Nguyen (Volume 111 Senior Technology Editor), Taylor Graham (Volume 111 Technology Editor), Benji Martinez (Volume 111 Technology Editor) Soundtrack: Composed and performed by Carter Jansen (Volume 110 Technology Editor)

Professor Khiara Bridges explores environmental injustice and disability-based abortion bans in the “dysgenic state,” where communities of color are exposed to environmental toxins that impair fetal health while being forced to give birth to health-impaired fetuses. Author: Khiara Bridges is a Professor of Law at the University of California, Berkeley, School of Law Host: Taylor Graham Technology Editors: Hiep Nguyen (Volume 111 Senior Technology Editor), Taylor Graham (Volume 111 Technology Editor), Benji Martinez (Volume 111 Technology Editor) Soundtrack: Composed and performed by Carter Jansen (Volume 110 Technology Editor) Article Abstract: Disability-selective abortion bans are laws that prohibit individuals from terminating a pregnancy because the fetus has been diagnosed with a health impairment. Many environmental toxins—to which low-income people and people of color disproportionately are exposed—are known to cause impairments in fetuses. When the fact of environmental injustice is read together with disability-selective abortion bans, we see that in one moment, the state fails to protect its citizens from toxins that impair fetal health, while in another moment, that same government compels its citizens to give birth to health-impaired fetuses. This Article identifies these two moments as the dysgenic state. Whereas the eugenic state of the early twentieth century sought to remove impairments from the population, the dysgenic state of the early twenty-first century seems committed to producing an impaired citizenry. This Article makes two important interventions into the existing literature. First, the Article intervenes simply to identify the dysgenic state—to call out the processes that harm the health of fetuses and then compel pregnant people to carry these pregnancies to term. Second, the Article intervenes to analyze the racial stakes of the dysgenic state. What is the significance of the empirically documented fact that people of color are disproportionately exposed to environmental toxins? What does it mean that because people of color also disproportionately bear the burdens of poverty, they are the least able to avoid the constraints of abortion regulations like disability-selective abortion bans? What does it mean, then, that the state produces impairments not in its citizenry generally, but in its nonwhite citizenry specifically? This is the puzzle that this Article sets out to describe and then analyze.