The BRICS+ summit was held in the Russian city of Kazan this past October. The original BRICS comprised four countries: Brazil, Russia, India, and China. The first meeting that they held was in 2009. South Africa joined in 2011. BRICS has now grown to include Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates. The recent summit also invited 13 countries to the group as partner states. Countries that have expressed interest in joining BRICS include Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand (which is a U.S. treaty ally), and Turkey (which is a member of NATO).

As countries in the Global South flock to form an increasingly significant geopolitical bloc in which China has assumed a leading role, it is important to understand how BRICS+ fits into China’s foreign policy strategy and the role that the BRICS mechanism is likely to play going forward. To discuss these issues, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Alexander Gabuev, director of the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center which is based in Berlin. His research focuses on Chinese and Russian foreign policy. 

Timestamps

[00:00] Start

[01:37] Behind the Creation of BRICS

[04:08] BRICS+ in China’s Foreign Policy Objectives

[06:20] Domination of China in BRICS+

[09:13] Russian and Chinese Interest in BRICS+

[14:16] China and the Expansion of BRICS

[18:07] Noteworthiness of the Kazan Declaration

[21:10] Possibility of a BRICS Currency

[28:11] BRICS+ and U.S. Policy Under Donald Trump

[30:26] Responding to BRICS+ and a Multipolar World

China is the world’s largest energy consumer and carbon emitter, accounting for one-third of global CO2 emissions. One of its biggest sources of emissions is coal, which plays a central role in China’s economy. At the same time, however, China is the world’s leading supplier of renewable energy, largely due to significant government investments in green technologies, including solar manufacturing, batteries, and minerals. In September 2020, China’s leader Xi Jinping announced the goal of achieving peak CO2 emissions before 2030 and carbon neutrality before 2060.” This ambitious pledge, if realized, will be an important step in global efforts to limit global warming.

In the past few years, the increasingly competitive and fraught relationship between the United States and China has spilled into the climate domain, threatening the potential for both countries to work together to address climate change. That is the topic of a recent commentary co-authored by Margaret Pearson and Michael Davidson. The paper is titled, “Where are the US and China on addressing climate change?”, and it can be found on the Brookings Institution website. In this episode of China Global, host Bonnie Glaser speaks with one of the authors, Michael Davidson, who is an assistant professor at the School of Global Policy and Strategy and the Mechanical and Aerospace Engineering Department of the Jacobs School of Engineering at the University of California San Diego.

Timestamps

[01:57] China’s Approach to Addressing Climate Change

[04:26] Considerations Behind China’s Climate Policy 

[07:37] Doubling Down on Coal Domestically

[10:34] Evaluating China’s Progress Toward Carbon Neutrality

[14:42] Security and China’s Climate Change Policy

[19:13] China’s International Climate Cooperation

[22:45] US-China Working Group on Enhancing Climate Action 

[30:27] The Green Belt and Road Initiative

For many years, China’s nuclear doctrine was widely described as “minimum nuclear deterrence,” which essentially means that it relied on a limited number of nuclear weapons to deter an adversary from attacking. China’s authoritative defense white papers asserted that China sought to maintain a lean, effective and credible deterrent force, was committed to the policy of no first use of nuclear weapons, pursued a defensive nuclear strategy and would never enter into a nuclear arms race with any other country. 

In recent years, however, China has begun to expand and modernize its nuclear forces. Beijing is not transparent about its nuclear arsenal or its doctrine, however, which creates uncertainty for the United States and its allies.

To help us decipher Beijing’s rapid nuclear expansion, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by John Culver, a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub and a former CIA senior intelligence officer. He is a co-author of a recent report published by the Atlantic Council titled “Adapting US Strategy to Account for China’s Transformation into a Peer Nuclear Power.”

Episode Highlights

[1:55] Key identifiable changes in China’s nuclear forces 

[3:49] China’s nascent nuclear triad 

[6:51] The drivers of China’s nuclear expansion 

[11:00] The recent ICBM test and its implications 

[14:50] How China might use its nuclear weapons 

[18:43] Will China change its nuclear declaratory policy

[24:59] How China’s relationship with Russia could shape Beijing’s calculous 

[27:45] How the U.S. and its allies should respond  

There are many writings by Western scholars on Chinese foreign as well as domestic policy. Yet few have ventured to analyze the internal intellectual debates in China that, either partly or significantly, shape Chinese policymaking. A recent book from the European Council on Foreign Relations titled The Idea of China: Chinese Thinkers on Power, Progress, and People, intends to fill that gap. Written by Alicja Bachulska, Mark Leonard, and Janka Oertel, the book presents some of the leading Chinese perspectives on a range of contemporary global as well as domestic issues. 

To help us further understand Chinese thinking and its significance, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Alicja Bachulska, one of the co-authors of the book and a policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations. 

Timestamps

[01:22] Significance of Intellectual Debates in China

[04:31] Gauging the Candor of Interview Responses

[06:35] Who are the China solutionists? 

[08:25] Examining the “Great Changes” Taking Place

[11:52] Strengthening China’s Discourse Power

[15:22] Where is China successfully shaping narratives?

[18:05] China on the Defense or Offense

[22:36] Rising East, Declining West

[28:49] Responding to Chinese Discourse in the Global South

The Forum on China–Africa Cooperation, or FOCAC, was established in 2000 as a platform for facilitating multilateral cooperation between the People’s Republic of China and countries in Africa. A FOCAC summit is held every three years and is the occasion to issue joint declarations and a three-year China-Africa program plan. The 2024 FOCAC took place in Beijing from September 4th to September 6th under the theme “Joining Hands to Advance Modernization and Build a High-Level China-Africa Community with a Shared Future.” Heads of state and delegations from 53 African countries attended the forum, which made it the largest diplomatic event held by China this year.

To discuss the recent FOCAC meeting and Chinese interests in Africa, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Mr. Paul Nantulya who is Research Associate at the Africa Center for Strategic Studies at National Defense University. His research interests center on African security issues, and China-Afro-Asia engagements.  

Timestamps

[00:00] Start

[01:38] History of the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation 

[03:56] FOCAC and Chinese Interests in Africa 

[06:46] Africa in China’s Hierarchy of Relationships

[10:28] Sino-American Competition in the Global South 

[13:20] Takeaways from the Recent FOCAC Summit

[18:27] Chinese Military Assistance in Africa

[24:27] FOCAC Engagement with Non-Governmental Entities 

[27:52] African Perceptions of the Efficacy of FOCAC

New Caledonia is a French territory comprising dozens of islands in the South Pacific. It possesses 25% of world’s nickel resources, a mineral critical in the development of weaponry. Several referenda on full independence from France have been held, but none have passed. In recent years, China has paid growing attention to the region, and New Caledonia is one of its targets of interest.

A new report from the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), titled “When China knocks at the door of New Caledonia,” explains China’s interests, intentions, and activities in New Caledonia. It calls for greater attention to the territory and makes recommendations for the US and other regional actors to address the growing Chinese interference.

To discuss Beijing’s approach to New Caledonia, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by the report’s author, Anne-Marie Brady, Professor of Political Science at the University of Canterbury in New Zealand. She specializes in Chinese domestic politics and foreign policy, polar politics, China-Pacific politics, and New Zealand foreign policy. 

Timestamps

[00:00] Start

[01:46] Introduction to New Caledonia

[04:20] China’s Interest and Involvement 

[07:22] Expansion of the International United Front 

[11:48] Manifestation Within New Caledonia

[16:22] The Belt and Road Initiative in New Caledonia

[21:34] Establishing Diplomatic Relations

[25:29] China’s Relationship with France

[28:29] Recommendations for Outside Powers and Others

Most observers of China’s relations with the world maintain that China’s foreign policy started becoming more assertive beginning in the 2010s. The label “wolf warrior diplomacy” was coined by Western media to describe the aggressive language used by Chinese diplomats. The term “wolf warrior” comes from the title of the Chinese action film Wolf Warrior 2 and describes a more combative approach used by many Chinese diplomats, especially in social media and in interviews.

Explanations for China’s increased diplomatic assertiveness vary, ranging from rising military and economic might to the personal leadership style of General Secretary Xi Jinping. A recently published book titled “China’s Rising Foreign Ministry,” investigates the role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in shaping and implementing Chinese foreign policy. In the words of a Southeast Asian diplomat who was interviewed by the book’s author, “China has a bigger international influence in the last five years—and it is the PRC foreign ministry that is pushing and driving it" (114).

Host Bonnie Glaser is joined by the book’s author Dylan Loh Ming Hui, Assistant Professor of Public Policy and Global Affairs at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore. His research focuses on Chinese foreign policy, Southeast Asian regionalism, and Asian conceptions of the international order. 

Timestamps

[01:57] What questions was the book seeking to address? 

[04:29] What do observers get wrong about China’s foreign ministry? 

[08:22] China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Policy Formulation

[13:30] Characteristics of Chinese Diplomacy in Southeast Asia

[16:50] Relationship Between the Chinese MFA and PLA 

[20:10] The Role of the International Liaison Department

[22:22] Interview Example from Dylan’s Publication

[25:04] Policy Implications and Lessons to be Learned

[28:43] Changes Since the Publication of the Book

[32:15] Predictions for the Future of the China MFA

The waters, as well as the rocks, reefs and submerged shoals of the South China Sea are a major source of friction in East Asia. In recent months, tensions have flared between two of the claimants – China and the Philippines – over Second Thomas Shoal, a submerged feature in the Spratly Islands, which the Chinese call Ren Ai Jiao. In 1999, the Philippines intentionally grounded a Philippine Navy transport vessel called the Sierra Madre on the reef and since then the outpost has been manned by a small contingent of marines.

In 2016, an arbitral tribunal established under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea ruled that Second Thomas Shoal is a low-tide elevation located within the exclusive economic zone of the Philippines and therefore sovereignty belongs to the Philippines. No other country can legitimately claim sovereignty over the feature or the waters around it. Beijing doesn’t recognize the ruling, even though it was legally binding on both China and the Philippines.

Late last year, Chinese Coast Guard and maritime militia vessels began aggressively interfering with the Philippines’ routine missions to deliver supplies to the Filipino forces on the Sierra Madre. On several occasions, Chinese ships have used high-pressure water cannons and rammed Filipino boats. The most serious confrontation took place in mid-June, when the Chinese used axes and knives to damage multiple Philippine vessels. A Filipino navy sailor lost his thumb in the skirmish. Negotiations between Beijing and Manila in early July produced a provisional arrangement, and the Philippines subsequently successfully conducted a resupply operation. It is uncertain whether the understanding will hold, however, since Beijing and Manila publicly disagree about what has been agreed upon.

To discuss the situation at Second Thomas Shoal and China’s approach to the South China Sea, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Zhang Feng, a visiting scholar at Yale Law School’s Paul Tsai China Center. His research focuses on Chinese foreign policy, international relations theory, and international relations in East Asia. 

Timestamps

[00:00] Start

[02:31] Why is the South China Sea so important to China? 

[05:30] Has China overstepped in the South China Sea? 

[08:54] Reasons for Deepening Sino-Filipino Confrontation

[12:05] Beijing’s Reaction to a Reinforced Second Thomas Shoal

[13:30] Beijing’s Perception of the US-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty

[16:44] Miscalculating American Willingness to Intervene

[21:32] Beijing-Manila Provisional Agreement 

[25:00] Chinese Deadline for the Philippines vis-à-vis the Second Thomas Shoal

[27:38] Gauging the Risk of Escalation or Conflict

[30:25] Stabilizing and Resolving the Second Thomas Shoal Issue

Founded in 2001, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) is a Eurasian political, economic, and security forum led by Russia and China. And on July 4, 2024, the 24th summit of the SCO was convened in Astana, Kazakhstan. The summit resulted in the Astana Declaration that reaffirmed cooperation among the member states. 

This year’s summit was particularly notable due to Belarus’s accession as the SCO’s first European member state and the tenth member of the SCO. The continuous enlargement of the SCO seems indicative of the organization’s shifting role, evolving from a regional cooperative forum to a broader, perhaps counter-western bloc. 

This episode will focus on China’s strategy in the SCO, its intentions, and its objectives. Host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Dr. Eva Seiwert, an analyst at the Mercator Institute for China Studies (MERICS). Her research interests include China-Russia relations, China’s central Asian relations, and China’s behavior in international organizations. 

Timestamps

[01:39] Shifting Focus of the SCO

[03:32] Enlargement of the SCO

[05:25] SCO and China’s Foreign Policy

[07:22] July 2024 SCO Summit

[09:46] Implementation of Agreements

[11:38] Sino-Russian Sideline Meeting

[13:09] Sino-Russian Competition or Coordination

[15:14] Sino-Belarussian Joint Military Drill

[16:56] SCO and the War in Ukraine

[19:04] Controversial Issues in the SCO

[20:26] Tensions Between China and India

[21:29] New SCO Member States

[23:07] SCO and Chinese Institution Building 

[25:40] The impact of SCO: Why does it matter?

Quantum computing uses quantum mechanics to perform fast and complex calculations. It is often defined as a disruptive technology and is among the advanced technologies at the forefront of US-China competition. Although the US has been in the lead in the development and applications of quantum technology, China is making rapid strides. Earlier this year, China’s independently developed quantum computer, Origin Wukong, named after the Monkey King (a famous character from Chinese mythology) made the country the third in the world to develop this state-of-the-art machine. 

Quantum computing has many potential applications, including financial modeling, artificial intelligence, scientific research, as well as in defense areas, such as undersea warfare and military communications networks. A new report from the Center for a New American Security (CNAS), titled “The Quest for Qubits: Assessing U.S.-China Competition in Quantum Computing” explains the quantum strategies being pursued by the US and China. It makes recommendations for the US to strengthen its position in its competition with China in quantum computing.

Host Bonnie Glaser is joined by the report’s author, Sam Howell, an adjunct associate fellow, with the Technology and National Security program at CNAS. Her research interests include quantum information science, semi-conductor STEM workforce issues, and the use of emerging technologies to enhance human performance. 

Timestamps

[02:00] What is quantum computing?

[04:10] Quantum Computing in US-China Competition

[05:58] American and Chinese Strengths and Weaknesses

[09:36] Possibility of Working with Other Actors

[11:56] Status of US-China Scientific Collaboration

[14:30] Chinese Technological Self-Sufficiency

[17:58] Building a Quantum Technology Supply Chain

[22:05] Fostering a Quantum Technology Workforce

[25:52] Key Variables of US-China Competition

On May 27th, China, Japan, and the Republic of Korea concluded their Ninth Trilateral Summit in Seoul. Leaders of the three countries resumed their highest-level annual meetings for the first time in over four years. At the conclusion of the meeting, they issued a joint declaration that includes six priority areas of cooperation, ranging from sustainable development to economic collaboration and trade. 

What were Beijing’s interests and motivations in reviving this trilateral mechanism?

To discuss China’s participation in the trilateral summit, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Yun Sun, a Senior Fellow and Co-director of the East Asia program and Director of the China program at the Stimson Center in Washington.

Timestamps

[01:18] Reestablishing the Trilateral Leadership Mechanism

[06:14] Outcomes and Deliverables of the Trilateral Summit

[10:37] 2019 Chengdu Denuclearization Agreement

[13:38] China’s Import Ban on Japanese Seafood

[18:07] China on US-Japan-ROK Trilateral Cooperation

[23:58] Warming Russian-North Korean Relations

[29:30] Would Xi Jinping express his concerns with Vladimir Putin?