There are many writings by Western scholars on Chinese foreign as well as domestic policy. Yet few have ventured to analyze the internal intellectual debates in China that, either partly or significantly, shape Chinese policymaking. A recent book from the European Council on Foreign Relations titled The Idea of China: Chinese Thinkers on Power, Progress, and People, intends to fill that gap. Written by Alicja Bachulska, Mark Leonard, and Janka Oertel, the book presents some of the leading Chinese perspectives on a range of contemporary global as well as domestic issues. 

To help us further understand Chinese thinking and its significance, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Alicja Bachulska, one of the co-authors of the book and a policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations. 

Timestamps

[01:22] Significance of Intellectual Debates in China

[04:31] Gauging the Candor of Interview Responses

[06:35] Who are the China solutionists? 

[08:25] Examining the “Great Changes” Taking Place

[11:52] Strengthening China’s Discourse Power

[15:22] Where is China successfully shaping narratives?

[18:05] China on the Defense or Offense

[22:36] Rising East, Declining West

[28:49] Responding to Chinese Discourse in the Global South

The Forum on China–Africa Cooperation, or FOCAC, was established in 2000 as a platform for facilitating multilateral cooperation between the People’s Republic of China and countries in Africa. A FOCAC summit is held every three years and is the occasion to issue joint declarations and a three-year China-Africa program plan. The 2024 FOCAC took place in Beijing from September 4th to September 6th under the theme “Joining Hands to Advance Modernization and Build a High-Level China-Africa Community with a Shared Future.” Heads of state and delegations from 53 African countries attended the forum, which made it the largest diplomatic event held by China this year.

To discuss the recent FOCAC meeting and Chinese interests in Africa, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Mr. Paul Nantulya who is Research Associate at the Africa Center for Strategic Studies at National Defense University. His research interests center on African security issues, and China-Afro-Asia engagements.  

Timestamps

[00:00] Start

[01:38] History of the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation 

[03:56] FOCAC and Chinese Interests in Africa 

[06:46] Africa in China’s Hierarchy of Relationships

[10:28] Sino-American Competition in the Global South 

[13:20] Takeaways from the Recent FOCAC Summit

[18:27] Chinese Military Assistance in Africa

[24:27] FOCAC Engagement with Non-Governmental Entities 

[27:52] African Perceptions of the Efficacy of FOCAC

New Caledonia is a French territory comprising dozens of islands in the South Pacific. It possesses 25% of world’s nickel resources, a mineral critical in the development of weaponry. Several referenda on full independence from France have been held, but none have passed. In recent years, China has paid growing attention to the region, and New Caledonia is one of its targets of interest.

A new report from the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), titled “When China knocks at the door of New Caledonia,” explains China’s interests, intentions, and activities in New Caledonia. It calls for greater attention to the territory and makes recommendations for the US and other regional actors to address the growing Chinese interference.

To discuss Beijing’s approach to New Caledonia, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by the report’s author, Anne-Marie Brady, Professor of Political Science at the University of Canterbury in New Zealand. She specializes in Chinese domestic politics and foreign policy, polar politics, China-Pacific politics, and New Zealand foreign policy. 

Timestamps

[00:00] Start

[01:46] Introduction to New Caledonia

[04:20] China’s Interest and Involvement 

[07:22] Expansion of the International United Front 

[11:48] Manifestation Within New Caledonia

[16:22] The Belt and Road Initiative in New Caledonia

[21:34] Establishing Diplomatic Relations

[25:29] China’s Relationship with France

[28:29] Recommendations for Outside Powers and Others

Most observers of China’s relations with the world maintain that China’s foreign policy started becoming more assertive beginning in the 2010s. The label “wolf warrior diplomacy” was coined by Western media to describe the aggressive language used by Chinese diplomats. The term “wolf warrior” comes from the title of the Chinese action film Wolf Warrior 2 and describes a more combative approach used by many Chinese diplomats, especially in social media and in interviews.

Explanations for China’s increased diplomatic assertiveness vary, ranging from rising military and economic might to the personal leadership style of General Secretary Xi Jinping. A recently published book titled “China’s Rising Foreign Ministry,” investigates the role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in shaping and implementing Chinese foreign policy. In the words of a Southeast Asian diplomat who was interviewed by the book’s author, “China has a bigger international influence in the last five years—and it is the PRC foreign ministry that is pushing and driving it" (114).

Host Bonnie Glaser is joined by the book’s author Dylan Loh Ming Hui, Assistant Professor of Public Policy and Global Affairs at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore. His research focuses on Chinese foreign policy, Southeast Asian regionalism, and Asian conceptions of the international order. 

Timestamps

[01:57] What questions was the book seeking to address? 

[04:29] What do observers get wrong about China’s foreign ministry? 

[08:22] China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Policy Formulation

[13:30] Characteristics of Chinese Diplomacy in Southeast Asia

[16:50] Relationship Between the Chinese MFA and PLA 

[20:10] The Role of the International Liaison Department

[22:22] Interview Example from Dylan’s Publication

[25:04] Policy Implications and Lessons to be Learned

[28:43] Changes Since the Publication of the Book

[32:15] Predictions for the Future of the China MFA

The waters, as well as the rocks, reefs and submerged shoals of the South China Sea are a major source of friction in East Asia. In recent months, tensions have flared between two of the claimants – China and the Philippines – over Second Thomas Shoal, a submerged feature in the Spratly Islands, which the Chinese call Ren Ai Jiao. In 1999, the Philippines intentionally grounded a Philippine Navy transport vessel called the Sierra Madre on the reef and since then the outpost has been manned by a small contingent of marines.

In 2016, an arbitral tribunal established under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea ruled that Second Thomas Shoal is a low-tide elevation located within the exclusive economic zone of the Philippines and therefore sovereignty belongs to the Philippines. No other country can legitimately claim sovereignty over the feature or the waters around it. Beijing doesn’t recognize the ruling, even though it was legally binding on both China and the Philippines.

Late last year, Chinese Coast Guard and maritime militia vessels began aggressively interfering with the Philippines’ routine missions to deliver supplies to the Filipino forces on the Sierra Madre. On several occasions, Chinese ships have used high-pressure water cannons and rammed Filipino boats. The most serious confrontation took place in mid-June, when the Chinese used axes and knives to damage multiple Philippine vessels. A Filipino navy sailor lost his thumb in the skirmish. Negotiations between Beijing and Manila in early July produced a provisional arrangement, and the Philippines subsequently successfully conducted a resupply operation. It is uncertain whether the understanding will hold, however, since Beijing and Manila publicly disagree about what has been agreed upon.

To discuss the situation at Second Thomas Shoal and China’s approach to the South China Sea, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Zhang Feng, a visiting scholar at Yale Law School’s Paul Tsai China Center. His research focuses on Chinese foreign policy, international relations theory, and international relations in East Asia. 

Timestamps

[00:00] Start

[02:31] Why is the South China Sea so important to China? 

[05:30] Has China overstepped in the South China Sea? 

[08:54] Reasons for Deepening Sino-Filipino Confrontation

[12:05] Beijing’s Reaction to a Reinforced Second Thomas Shoal

[13:30] Beijing’s Perception of the US-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty

[16:44] Miscalculating American Willingness to Intervene

[21:32] Beijing-Manila Provisional Agreement 

[25:00] Chinese Deadline for the Philippines vis-à-vis the Second Thomas Shoal

[27:38] Gauging the Risk of Escalation or Conflict

[30:25] Stabilizing and Resolving the Second Thomas Shoal Issue

Founded in 2001, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) is a Eurasian political, economic, and security forum led by Russia and China. And on July 4, 2024, the 24th summit of the SCO was convened in Astana, Kazakhstan. The summit resulted in the Astana Declaration that reaffirmed cooperation among the member states. 

This year’s summit was particularly notable due to Belarus’s accession as the SCO’s first European member state and the tenth member of the SCO. The continuous enlargement of the SCO seems indicative of the organization’s shifting role, evolving from a regional cooperative forum to a broader, perhaps counter-western bloc. 

This episode will focus on China’s strategy in the SCO, its intentions, and its objectives. Host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Dr. Eva Seiwert, an analyst at the Mercator Institute for China Studies (MERICS). Her research interests include China-Russia relations, China’s central Asian relations, and China’s behavior in international organizations. 

Timestamps

[01:39] Shifting Focus of the SCO

[03:32] Enlargement of the SCO

[05:25] SCO and China’s Foreign Policy

[07:22] July 2024 SCO Summit

[09:46] Implementation of Agreements

[11:38] Sino-Russian Sideline Meeting

[13:09] Sino-Russian Competition or Coordination

[15:14] Sino-Belarussian Joint Military Drill

[16:56] SCO and the War in Ukraine

[19:04] Controversial Issues in the SCO

[20:26] Tensions Between China and India

[21:29] New SCO Member States

[23:07] SCO and Chinese Institution Building 

[25:40] The impact of SCO: Why does it matter?

Quantum computing uses quantum mechanics to perform fast and complex calculations. It is often defined as a disruptive technology and is among the advanced technologies at the forefront of US-China competition. Although the US has been in the lead in the development and applications of quantum technology, China is making rapid strides. Earlier this year, China’s independently developed quantum computer, Origin Wukong, named after the Monkey King (a famous character from Chinese mythology) made the country the third in the world to develop this state-of-the-art machine. 

Quantum computing has many potential applications, including financial modeling, artificial intelligence, scientific research, as well as in defense areas, such as undersea warfare and military communications networks. A new report from the Center for a New American Security (CNAS), titled “The Quest for Qubits: Assessing U.S.-China Competition in Quantum Computing” explains the quantum strategies being pursued by the US and China. It makes recommendations for the US to strengthen its position in its competition with China in quantum computing.

Host Bonnie Glaser is joined by the report’s author, Sam Howell, an adjunct associate fellow, with the Technology and National Security program at CNAS. Her research interests include quantum information science, semi-conductor STEM workforce issues, and the use of emerging technologies to enhance human performance. 

Timestamps

[02:00] What is quantum computing?

[04:10] Quantum Computing in US-China Competition

[05:58] American and Chinese Strengths and Weaknesses

[09:36] Possibility of Working with Other Actors

[11:56] Status of US-China Scientific Collaboration

[14:30] Chinese Technological Self-Sufficiency

[17:58] Building a Quantum Technology Supply Chain

[22:05] Fostering a Quantum Technology Workforce

[25:52] Key Variables of US-China Competition

On May 27th, China, Japan, and the Republic of Korea concluded their Ninth Trilateral Summit in Seoul. Leaders of the three countries resumed their highest-level annual meetings for the first time in over four years. At the conclusion of the meeting, they issued a joint declaration that includes six priority areas of cooperation, ranging from sustainable development to economic collaboration and trade. 

What were Beijing’s interests and motivations in reviving this trilateral mechanism?

To discuss China’s participation in the trilateral summit, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Yun Sun, a Senior Fellow and Co-director of the East Asia program and Director of the China program at the Stimson Center in Washington.

Timestamps

[01:18] Reestablishing the Trilateral Leadership Mechanism

[06:14] Outcomes and Deliverables of the Trilateral Summit

[10:37] 2019 Chengdu Denuclearization Agreement

[13:38] China’s Import Ban on Japanese Seafood

[18:07] China on US-Japan-ROK Trilateral Cooperation

[23:58] Warming Russian-North Korean Relations

[29:30] Would Xi Jinping express his concerns with Vladimir Putin?

On May 17, Russian President Vladimir Putin concluded a two-day visit to China for his 43rd meeting with Xi Jinping. Based on public readouts, Putin emphasized the economic benefits that the Sino-Russian partnership could bring to both countries. Economic integration between Russia and China has accelerated dramatically, with total trade between them reaching $240 billion US dollars in 2023. Beijing’s decision to increase trade with Moscow after the February 2022 invasion of Ukraine has kept the Russian economy afloat. 

Western sanctions have failed to cripple Russia’s economy or its war effort. After the European Union halted the import of Russian oil, China stepped in and has since become Russia’s top energy buyer. Moreover, China has become Russia’s top goods supplier, having surged its sales of machine tools, microelectronics, and other technology that Moscow uses to produce weaponry in its ongoing war with Ukraine. 

To discuss China’s trade with Russia, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Yanmei Xie. Yanmei is a Geopolitics Analyst at Gavekal Research, where she analyzes the implications of rising geopolitical and geoeconomic risks on trade, investments, and supply chains. Yanmei recently published a report on China’s economic support for Russia, which was titled “How China Keeps Russia in Business.” 

Timestamps

[02:00] China’s Economic Support of Russia 

[05:29] Areas of Success for Western Sanctions

[07:11] A Surge in Chinese Exports After the Invasion of Ukraine 

[09:54] Chinese Playbook for Circumventing Sanctions

[13:36] Chinese Provision of Crucial Materials

[15:17] Incentive to Capture the Russian Energy Market

[19:17] Impact of Western Industrial Policies on Sino-Russian Trade 

[20:20] Possibility of Increased Sanctions to Deter China

[23:24] China’s Toolbox of Retaliatory Measures 

[26:48] Plateauing Economic Support for Russia

China’s rate of economic growth has slowed markedly in recent years. According to Chinese government statistics, the economy grew by 5.2% in 2023. There are numerous challenges: weak consumer confidence, mounting local government debt, and a real estate market that used to fuel the economy, but is now in a prolonged downturn.

Many economists, including some in China, advocate that the government stimulate consumer spending. It is clear, however, that Xi Jinping is pursuing a different strategy. And this was quite clear when Chinese Premier Li Qiang delivered the Government Work Report last March.

Host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Tanner Greer, who argued in a recent article published in Foreign Policy and in his blog, The Scholar’s Stage, that Xi Jinping and the Politburo believe that science and technology are the answer to China’s problems. To quote from the article: “the central task of the Chinese state is to build an industrial and scientific system capable of pushing humanity to new technological frontiers.” Tanner is the director of the Center for Strategic Translation. As a journalist and researcher, his writing focuses on world politics and history. 

Timestamps

[01:43] Historical Narrative Informing China’s Belief in Techno-Industrial Policy

[03:47] How does China’s own history fit into this narrative?

[06:36] Evidence that Xi Jinping Believes in a Technological Revolution

[09:37] How does China assess the global balance of power?

[12:26] Three Premises Behind China’s Techno-Industrial Drive

[14:08] Influence of Intensifying US-China Technology Competition

[17:12] Acceleration of New Quality Productive Forces

[19:32] Skepticism of China’s Strategy

[26:43] Chinese Intellectuals Writing on Techno-Industrial Policy

In the past few weeks, China’s relations with Latin America and the Caribbean have been making headlines. Newsweek published an exclusive story about plans to create a Chinese-run special economic zone on the island of Antigua that will have a port, a dedicated airline, its own customs and immigration procedures, and be able to issue passports. An international crypto services zone will offer opportunities to participate in cryptocurrency operations from mining to dealing.

The Americas Quarterly reported that China has expressed interest in building a port complex near the Strait of Magellan at the southern tip of South America, which is considered the most important natural passage between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. From there, according to the Americas Quarterly, Beijing could grow its presence in the region and also project influence in Antarctica.

And in late April, China held the first China-Latin American and Caribbean States Space Cooperation Forum, which opened with a congratulatory letter from Xi Jinping applauding the high-level space cooperation partnership in which he emphasized the benefits of marrying China’s mature space technology with the unique geographic advantage of the countries in the Latin America and Caribbean region.

To discuss Chinese interests in and strategy toward the Latin America and Caribbean region–known as the LAC–host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Leland Lazarus. He is the Associate Director of National Security at Florida International University’s Jack D. Gordon Institute of Public Policy and an expert on China-Latin America relations. He formerly served as the Special Assistant and Speechwriter to the Commander of US Southern Command and as a State Department Foreign Service Officer, with postings in Barbados and China. 

Editorial Correction: Regarding the statement on the price of Huawei's equipment, it is approximately 30% cheaper than Nokia or Ericcson, rather than one-third the price. 

Timestamps

[02:30] China’s Interest in LAC Countries

[04:44] Implementation of BRI in LAC Countries

[07:23] China’s Investment in Energy Development

[09:39] Huawei’s Penetration into LAC Countries

[11:57] Role of Perú in Beijing’s Regional Strategy

[14:56] China-LAC Cooperation in Space

[20:56] Receptivity of China to LAC Countries

[25:30] How should the US compete against China in LAC?