Today's daf is sponsored by Rochel Cheifetz in loving memory of her father, Shragai Cohen, שרגא פייוול בן אברהם בן ציון הלוי, whose yahrzeit was 8 Kislev,and her maternal grandparents,רב משה בן יהודה לייב, whose yahrzeit was 4 Kislev and חיה צפורה בת ר׳ יהודה משה, whose yartzeit is today, 23 Kislev. "My father's smile, HUGE love for Israel and sage wisdom are sorely missed." 

Today's daf is sponsored by Leah Brick for the refuah shleima to her colleague and friend Jonathan Cohen הרב יהונתן איתן הכהן בן בתשבע ברכה.

Today's daf is sponsored by the Hadran Women of Long Island in honor of and as a zechut for our friend and co-learner, Tzippy Wolkenfeld, Fayga Zissel bat Shayna Yosefa, בתוך שאר חולי ישראל who is donating her kidney this morning to someone she has never met. "May both Tzippy and her recipient have an easy and speedy recovery. We salute Tzippy for her willingness to literally give a part of herself to help someone - but we aren’t surprised! May her act of chessed be a zechut for all!"

The Gemara delves into the different positions regarding compromise. It explains, based on the braita, that there are four different opinions about whether or not one should use/suggest compromise be used as an alternative to judgment. 

What should judges be conscious of when they are ruling? What responsibility do they have? What responsibility is upon the community to appoint the proper judges. What responsibility is on the litigants to prevent perversion of justice? 

Today's daf is sponsored in honor of Marcel Loewenberg on his 75th birthday, with love from his children and grandchildren. “We are grateful for the joy of Torah learning you’ve instilled in us.”

While Shmuel maintains that a ruling by two judges is valid, Rabbi Abahu disagrees with this position. Rabbi Abba challenges Rabbi Abahu's view from a Mishna in Bechorot 28b, which appears to validate even a single judge's ruling. This apparent contradiction is resolved by explaining that the Mishna refers to a specific case where both litigants explicitly accepted the authority of the single judge to rule on their case.

The Mishna in Bechorot addresses a case where the litigants accepted a judge's authority, but he subsequently made an error in his ruling and became liable for any resulting losses. However, if his mistake involved ruling contrary to an explicit Mishna, he bears no liability since such a ruling is automatically void. Consequently, the Gemara concludes that the judge's error must have involved a matter of judgment - specifically, determining which opinion to follow.

Rabbi Meir and the rabbis dispute whether mediation requires one or three people. The Gemara initially suggests that this debate parallels the disagreement between Rabbi Abahu and Shmuel, as mediation is likened to judgment based on the verse in Samuel II 8:15. However, this parallel is ultimately rejected. Instead, their disagreement centers on whether mediation should be equated with formal judgment at all. Rav Acha explains that the requirement of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel for two people in mediation serves only to ensure proper witnessing of the proceedings - in principle, a single mediator would suffice.

Is it necessary to perform a kinyan, act of acquisition, in a mediation proceeding?

If judges have concluded proceedings (gmar din) in a case, they can no longer switch to mediation. Rav later provides a precise definition of what constitutes gmar din.

The text then explores several fundamental questions regarding mediation and compromise: Is it merely permitted or actually preferred? Could it sometimes be forbidden? If mediation is permitted, at what stage in the legal proceedings does this option expire? Multiple opinions are presented addressing these questions.

In Tehillim 10:3 it says that God scorns a botzea who blesses or one who blesses a botzea. Three different interpretations of that verse are brought - one of which relates to mediation and how it is despised by God.

The Gemara also explores multiple interpretations of two other relevant verses: Samuel II 8:15, which discusses the relationship between law and charity, and Deuteronomy 1:17, which instructs judges not to fear any person.

The discussion concludes with several statements emphasizing the gravity of judicial responsibility and the solemnity with which judges must approach their rulings.

This week's learning is sponsored by Jordana Schoor in honor of their son Saadya's marriage to Odel Perets. "Wishing them a home full of love, mazal, and Torah values."

Even though it says in the Mishna that a court comprises three judges, there are exceptions. An expert can judge on his own. What determines that someone is an expert judge? Even though an expert does not need to get permission from the Nasi or Exilarch, if the Nasi or Exilarch gives him permission to judge, and he errs in a particular case, he is not obligated to compensate for the loss he caused. While it is clear that the Exilarch's permission exempt a judge ruling in Israel, but can the Nasi's (in Israel) appointment of the judge exempt the judge from liability in Babylonia? The answer is no, as learned from a story regarding Raba bar Hana who received permission from Rabbi Yehuda haNasi to rule, just as he was leaving Israel.

In what cases does a judge who makes a mistake, need to pay to compensate for the loss he caused?

Rabbi Yehuda haNasi also granted permission to Rav to rule as an expert, just before he went to Babylonia. However, he did not grant him the authority to permit firstborn animals to be eaten by identifying blemishes. Both Rav and Raba bar Hana were nephews of Rabbi Chiya, who was the one who asked Rabbi Yehuda haNasi to permit them both to judge. However, he called Raba the son of his brother and Rav the son of his sister, even though Rav was also the son of his brother. To explain this, the Gemara explains that Rabbi Chiya's half-brother and half-sister married each other and were Rav's parents. Another possible explanation is provided as well.

Why did Rabbi Yehuda haNasi not allow Rav to permit firstborn animals? The Gemara brings two possible suggestions. The first explanation is that it was to ensure people would respect Raba bar Hana when he and Rav arrived in Babylonia, as they would see that he had the authority to do something that Rav did not. The second suggestion is that Rav was such an expert that Rabbi Yehuda haNasi was concerned he would permit certain blemishes and people would conclude on their own that blemishes that seemed similar were also permanent blemishes and incorrectly permit firstborn animals.

Why did Rabbi Chiya ask Rabbi Yehuda haNasi not only to grant permission to Rav and Raba bar Hana to rule, but also to teach? An answer is brought from a story of a teacher who taught but was misunderstood and caused many people to make a mistake regarding laws of impurity. Therefore, one must also receive permission to teach only if they can teach clearly. Other stories relating to issues about teaching are brought, relating to not issuing a ruling in a city if one's teacher is nearby.

Shmuel ruled that if two judges ruled in a case, their judgment would be effective, even though this is considered to be impudent. However, when mediation is done, only two judges are needed to mediate.

Study Guide Sanhedrin 4

The Gemara suggests that the basis of the debate between the rabbis and Rabbi Yehuda about whether we rule monetary law by three judges or five judges is based on how they extrapolate the verse - is there em l'mikra, we rule by the way it is generally read, or em l'masoret, by the way it is actually written?

According to Rabbi Yochanan there are five rabbis who all hold that when there is a contradiction between the way the text is read/pronounced and the way it is written, we follow the way it is pronounced. Each case where the rabbis ruled in this manner is brought and explained.  

Rav Acha bar Yaakov challenges Rabbi Yochanan as he thinks that everyone holds yesh em l'mikra, as everyone follow the way it is generally read, as can be proven from the prohibition of cooking meat with milk. as it is read as milk - chalev - and not forbidden fat - cheilev. This assumption is disproven and a different explanation is brought to explain why everyone agrees in the milk/meat verse.

Study Guide Sanhedrin 3

This week's learning is sponsored by Helen Danczak in loving memory of her father on his yahrzeit. 

Today's daf is sponsored in honor of Adina Hagege's birthday with love from her sisters and brother. "Her dedication and passion for learning are an inspiration to her family. With love from her whole family."

Today's daf is sponsored by Heather Stone for the physical and psychological wellbeing of Yaacov (Kobi) Levy, ben Shaul v'Ruti, a war veteran who has PTSD and is assisted by Morpheus, a Labrador service dog. Kobi and Morpheus were terribly mistreated by a bus driver and the Israeli police this week, and are still recovering.

There are three different ways to read the first six words of the Mishna: "Monetary laws are judged by three, theft and injuries by three." Are the first three coming to explain the second three or are they referring to a different case/different rule? All conclude the same bottom line law - that for loans and admissions, you would need three regular people to judge and for theft and injuries you would need three judges. However, how they read this into the words of the Mishna, what was the original Torah law, and how the Rabbis changed it, and why is a subject of debate.

Why are damages and half damages listed in the Mishna - why aren’t they included in injuries?

From where do we derive that monetary law is ruled in front of three judges? There is a debate between Rabbi Yoshia and Rabbi Yonatan - is there debate just about the derivation or do they have a different understanding of how judgments are decided?

Rebbi holds that monetary laws are ruled by five judges. From where does he derive five?

Study Guide Sanhedrin 2

Sanhedrin bookmark

Masechet Sanhedrin is sponsored by Jina Davidovich in loving memory of her father, Vladimir Davidovich, Zev ben Yitzchak v'Chana, on his first yahrzeit. "My father always encouraged my learning and was my greatest chevruta. He instilled within me, and his many students, a deep love of Torah. May his neshama have an aliyah." 

Today's daf is sponsored by Norman Eliaser in honor of Shira Eliaser birthday. "Thank you for being an amazing study buddy, in addition to being the best wife in the world!"

Today’s daf is sponsored by Lana Kerzner and Adina Hagege in memory of their grandmother, Ethel Wolinsky Greenstone, whose yahrzeit is this week. "Although she passed away 79 years ago, her legacy lived on through her children. They passed on to us a hunger for learning, a quest for equal rights for women and scholarship, and an analytic spirit that spans the generations. We believe that she would have taken such joy knowing that two of her granddaughters bear her name and her spirit, as they learn Daf Yomi virtually across oceans together."

The court system was made up of different-sized courts. The Mishna delineates which types of cases would be brought in front of a court of three, twenty-three, and seventy-one. Some tannaim require five or seven judges for certain types of cases. The size of twenty-three and seventy-one are derived from the Torah - how?

The Gemara notes that loans and admissions are excluded from the list, even though they also require three judges, like for theft and injuries. They are excluded because they do not require three expert judges, but can be ruled by any three people. The reason for this is to ensure that people are not deterred from loaning money to others. 

• For the text of the Hadran ceremony, click here.
• For more information about What is a Siyum, click here

Siyum Masechet Bava Batra is sponsored by Lesley Glassberg Nadel in loving memory of her father Bernie Glassberg, Berel ben Herschel haLevi, whose 50th yahrzeit is Kislev 17 - May his memory be blessed.

Introduction to Masechet Sanhedrin

Study Guide Bava Batra 155

If one says on one's deathbed that money is owed to someone - is that statement believed or should we assume that the person was only trying to make it look like their children do not have a lot of money? Would the same apply in a case where all the money was dedicated to the Temple rather than to the person's children?

Can an heir claim that even though their bequeather may have said they owed someone money, they subsequently said they had paid them back? In what case are they believed and in what case are they not believed?

What are the differences between a loan with a contract and a loan with an oral agreement? One who has a loan with a document can collect from liened property that has been sold, but an oral loan can only be collected from free (unsold) property. If a guarantor signs after the loan takes place, can one collect from the guarantor, and if so, are there any limitations?

Is the property of a borrower liened to the creditor by Torah law or by rabbinic law? Raba and Ulla each take sides on this debate.

Rav and Shmuel disagree with Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish whether an oral loan can be collected from orphans or from purchasers. Rav Papa comes up with a unique ruling - not fully matching either position, as he saw a need in society to prevent creditors from refusing to loan money and to prevent a breakdown in the market where buyers are hesitant to purchase land.

Study Guide Bava Batra 174

Areivut and kablanut are two different methods of guaranteeing a loan. What is the difference between them? There are several different opinions about which language indicates one or the other.

One's land acts as a guarantee for a loan and therefore the creditor cannot directly collect from the borrower's land before demanding repayment from the borrower.

If a guarantor pays a debt on behalf of orphans for their father's debt, and then goes to get repaid from the orphans, they do not need to pay the money back until they are bar mitzva age. Two reasons are brought - what is the practical difference between them?

A guarantor for a ketuba different than a guarantor for a loan - in what way and why?

This week’s learning is sponsored by Robert and Paula Cohen in loving memory of my grandfather, Joseph Cohen, Yosef ben Moshe HaCohen, z”l. “My grandfather was hard working, loved to sing, especially as a chazan, and brought up his family to be strongly committed to Judaism.” 

If two people have the same name, can they collect from other people if we cannot be sure that the document in their hand is really their own? It can be inferred from our Mishna that they can collect, but a braita rules that they cannot. The root of the debate is either regarding whether documents can be acquired by passing them from one to the other (otiyot niknot b'mesira) or perhaps both hold that they can, but the root of the debate is whether one needs to prove the document was passed to them from the other. Rava and Abaye debated the latter issue and a braita is quoted from which each one tries to prove his position.

Another braita rules against both the Mishna and the previously quoted braita, holding that two people with the same name can pull out a loan document one on the other. The root of the debate is whether or not a borrower can have a scribe draft a promissory note not in the presence of the creditor. If it can be done, one can pretend to be the borrower, draft the note, and then use it to collect from the other.

If a person tells one's children on their deathbed that one of their promissory notes in their possession is already collected, the children cannot claim any of the loans, as the burden of proof is on the one who collects. If there are two promissory notes for the same person, they can collect the one with the smaller amount.

When one has a loan with a guarantor, can the creditor collect from the guarantor? If so, under what circumstances?

What is the source from the Tanach for the responsibility of a guarantor? At first, they try to learn it from Yehuda and Reuven, when they each promised to take responsibility for bringing Binyamin to Egypt, but that source is rejected and instead, verses from Proverbs 20:16 and Proverbs 6:1-3 are used as the source.

Ameimar views a guarantor's commitment as asmachta (a commitment that the guarantor never really meant to keep) and would then be a subject of debate between Rabbi Yosi and Rabbi Yehuda if it is a valid commitment. Rav Ashi rejects this explanation and explains why it is not viewed as asmachta.