What else does the word "possessions" include?

Some stories are brought of women on their deathbeds who promised their property to one person and then changed their minds and promised it to someone else. The rabbis debated what the ruling should be - if one's word on one's deathbed and as if they were already acquired, is one not able to change one's mind?

A case is brought of a woman who gave her possessions to her son before her second marriage to prevent them from going to her husband. When she later got divorced, was she able to retrieve her possessions from her son? 

Another case was a woman who would give her orchard to her brother every time she got sick, as she thought she was dying. Each time she got better, the gift would be canceled. One time, at her request, he acquired it in a way that it would be effective even if she lived - he had her leave over a bit and did a kinyan. However, Rav Nachman ruled that since she said she was giving it to him because she thought she would die, once she got better, the kinyan was ineffective.

The Gemara clarifies the case of a gift on one's deathbed where one only gives away part of one's property. Some understand that the gift is effective even if there was no kinyan and quoted this in the name of Rav Nachman. But Rava corrects them and explains that Rav Nachman holds that the Mishna was referring only to cases where a kinyan was effected, meaning that if one gave away not all of his possessions and then died or got better, if the gift was given without a kinyan, the person would not acquire the possessions. Additionally, if one did do a kinyan and didn't give away all of one's possessions but stated that it was because the person thought they were dying, then if they got better, the gift would be returned to him/her.

Abaye questions Rav Yosef's difficulty with Rav Yehuda and Rav Yirmia's interpretation of the Mishna by showing that sometimes the Mishna uses the word "karka (land)" to include movable items (metaltelin) and "kol shehu (any amount)" can refer to a particular size (larger than just any amount). One Mishna is in Peah 3:8 regarding the language used to free a slave. The other is in Chulin 11:2 regarding the first shearings where "kol shehu" means a particular amount. However, in conclusion, they explain these words in the above-mentioned Mishnayot as exceptions to the rule, and Abaye's difficulty against Rav Yosef is resolved.

What is the difference between one who says "My metaltelin (movable property)should be given to...," "All my metaltelin (movable property) should be given to...," and "Anything that is metaltel (can be moved) should be given to..."? 

Are slaves considered property (karka) or movable items (metaltelin)? Two sources are brought to prove that they are categorized as movable property, but both suggestions are rejected. 

Five cases are brought where the halakha will only be effective if ALL of one's property is included. Regarding four out of five of these rulings, "all of one's property" includes movable and non-movable items, meaning that even if one were to leave out some movable items, the halakha would not be in effect. The one case where it does not include movable items is a woman who forfeits the right to collect her ketuba if all of the property is divided between her and the sons. If movable items were not divided, we can still assume she forfeited her right to collect the ketuba, as a ketuba can only be collected from land. 

If one gives away all of one's "nechasim (possessions)," what items does that word include?

Study Guide Bava Batra 149

What language must be used for a gift stated on one's deathbed to be valid?

If one sells all of one's property on one's deathbed, is it a valid sale if one recovers from one's illness?

If one admits on one's deathbed that one owes money, do we believe the admission or is it possible the person is lying and just wants to show they don’t have a lot of money? A story is brought with Issur the convert and how he was able to use this (an admission) as a solution to passing on his money that was in Rava’s possession (as Rava was watching it for him) to his son, who was conceived before his conversion and therefore was unable to inherit the money.

The Mishna says the gift is valid if one divides up one's possessions on one's deathbed but leaves over land of any amount, and then recovers. Rav Yehuda says in the name of Rav that "any amount" actually means an amount worthy of sustaining him/her. Rav Yirmiya bar Abba says that even if one leaves movable items worthy of sustaining the person. Rav Zeira supports their opinions and Rav Yosef questions them based on the wording in the Mishna ("land" and "any amount"). Abaye supports Rabbi Zeira from a Mishna in Peah where land includes movable items.

Rav Nachman ruled that one cannot transfer intangible items, like the right to live in a house or the right to future fruits from a tree even on one's deathbed. By doing this, he equates a gift on one's deathbed to a regular gift. However, he ruled elsewhere that the rights to collect a loan with an oral agreement can be transferred to another on one's deathbed, even though this right can't be transferred from one who is not on one's deathbed. The Gemara brings two resolutions.

If one gave a tree to one person and the fruits to another, can we assume that when the giver gave the tree to one, he retained the space on the tree where the fruits grow and passed those on to the other, making it an effective gift as he is giving a part of the tree that is in existence. Or did the giver not retain the space where the fruits go and gave the second person the right to collect fruits that will grow that are not yet in existence, which is not a valid gift? If the answer is that it is not effective, would it be the same work in a case where one gives the tree to someone but retains the fruits for oneself? A different version of this question is brought by Rabbi Abba. In his version, this differentiation between selling to two people and selling to one person and retaining part for oneself was asked on a statement that Reish Lakish made about one who sold a house without the upper level. According to both versions, the answer is that we can definitively say in the case that one sold/gave part to someone else, the part they retained would remain in their possession as surely people retain generously when it affects themselves.

If one begins dividing up one's possessions and stops in the middle and then continues and gives away the rest, are the first gifts viewed as regular gifts (as one was only giving part of their possessions at that point) or are they viewed as gifts on one's deathbed since in the end, all of the possessions were given away?

Rav Acha rules that even if one gave away one's possessions on one's deathbed and then healed, even if those were all of that person's known possessions, one should be concerned that maybe the person has other possessions in another country and therefore the gift is effective. This seems to contradict the Mishna.  How can this be explained?

If one gives away money on one's deathbed and then changes one's mind about part of the funds, does that cancel the entire first gift or only part? What are the ramifications of this? The Gemara brings a braita to prove that the first gift is completely canceled. At first, the Gemara rejects the proof but then reestablishes it and concludes that the first gift is completely canceled.

If one consecrates all of one's property on one's deathbed, or declares it all ownerless, or gives it all to charity, and then gets better, is this canceled?

Study Guide Bava Batra 147

Today's daf is sponsored by Esther Kremer in loving memory of Manny Gross on his 2nd yahrzeit. "May his memory forever be a blessing."

Today's daf is sponsored by Marc and Debbie Pershan in loving memory of  Marc's mother, Perel Bayla bat Simcha, on the occasion of the shloshim.

From where do we learn that a declaration of a person on their deathbed is effective as if an act of acquiring was performed? The sages brought sources for the law from two verses in the Torah and two from the Prophets. Rava says in the name of Rav Nachman that this law is not derived from the Torah, but the rabbis instituted it to prevent the person from being overly distressed. The Gemara questions Rav Nachman from a different statement of Rav Nachman on a ruling of Shmuel. Shmuel held that if one sold a promissory note of a loan to another and then pardoned the original loan, the loan would be canceled, and even the heir of the original lender could cancel the loan. Rav Nachman explained that even Shmuel would agree though that if the promissory note were not sold to another but given as a gift from the lender on his/her deathbed, the heir cannot cancel the loan. This seems to show that the power of the words of a person on their deathbed is valid by Torah law as they are stronger than a regular gift. They resolve this difficulty by explaining that Rav Nachman gave it the strength of Torah law, even though it is rabbinic.

Rava quoted Rav Nachman that one cannot transfer intangible items - like the right to live in a house or the right to future fruits from a tree, even on one's deathbed. This seems to show that Rav Nachman treats a gift on one's deathbed like laws relating to gifts of one who is healthy. The Gemara raises a difficulty on this assumption.

Today's daf is sponsored by Diana Bloom in loving memory of her Zayde, Israel (Ignacio) Marmurek on his 41st yahrzeit. 

Today's daf is sponsored by Rhona Fink in honor of our fellow Daf learner Elana Weinberg and her husband Rabbi Brahm Weinberg on the occasion of the Bar Mitzvah of their son Joseph Asher in Silver Spring, Maryland, Parshat Vayera, this past Shabbat. "Joseph is already following in the footsteps of his parents with his demonstration of confidence, knowledge, and humility."

After a betrothal, a groom would bring gifts to the bride called sivlonot. If the marriage was canceled, under what circumstances would the sivlonot be returned? This depends on what kinds of gifts were given (perishable or long-lasting), whether they were (small) gifts meant to be used in her father's house or (large) gifts for the couple's future home. If the groom ate in her father's home when bringing the gift, he would not be able to retrieve the gifts. What if the husband drank but did not eat, or ate outside the house, or the husband's messenger ate the food? If the groom ate less than a dinar's worth, can he claim back all the presents or only a percentage? If the gift went up in value and was then returned, who gets the enhanced value? Rava asks: If the gifts were to be consumed, but were not yet consumed when the marriage was canceled, are they returned? Almost all these questions remain unanswered.

Two stories are brought relating a situation that happened with an engaged couple. In one, the husband sent gifts and in the other, there was a rumor that the bride had no sense of smell and the groom wanted to cancel the betrothal, but he tested her to see if it was true, and it was not. Each comes to teach something unique either about Israel or about a claim a husband could make and whether it would be accepted.

Ravin ruled that even though we distinguished between perishable and non-perishable gifts, this distinction does not hold if the woman is the cause of the canceled wedding. In that case, all gifts are returned, even a bundle of vegetables.

What assumptions can be made about a declaration on one's deathbed? A distinction is made between one who gives away all of their possessions and one who only gives away part. If they gave it all away, it is assumed they thought they were dying. Therefore, if they heal, the gift is ineffective. If only part were given away, the gift would be effective.  This is based on an "umdana" - an assessment of their intent. The Gemara tries to match the opinion in our Mishna to tannaim who said the same thing regarding other cases in other places to determine who is the author of the Mishna.

A contradiction was brought from a braita against the Mishna regarding returning reciprocal gifts for a wedding (shushbinim). There were three resolutions. The third established the case of the Mishna of one when the groom died and left a yabam, a brother to perform levirate marriage. When the gifts are given to the yabam, he must share them with his brothers. To raise a difficulty against this answer they compare the case to one where the groom dies after betrothal and before the marriage. Just as in that case, the money from the betrothal does not have to be returned as the woman can claim that it is not her fault that they are not getting married, likewise with the shushbinim, the family that first received gifts can claim that there is no need for them to send gifts if the groom is no longer alive since they did not rejoice with him at the wedding. However, Rav Yosef explains that the cases aren't comparable as the case with the yabam was one where the other family did join the brother's wedding before he died and rejoiced with him, but did not yet bring the gifts.

The Gemara attempts to establish that the opinion mentioned previously, that a woman does not have to return the money of the betrothal if the husband died as she can claim it was not her fault they never got married, is a subject of a tannaitic debate. However, this suggestion is rejected and the tannaitic debate is explained to be regarding a case where the woman, not the man, died and the debate is whether or not betrothal money was meant to be given and kept even if the marriage never happened. If one holds that it was not intended to be kept even if the marriage never happened, the woman's heirs would need to return the money if that was the custom in the place where they lived. That issue was not only a debate between Rabbi Natan and Rabbi Yehuda haNasi in the source quoted previously, but also can help explain a debate in a different braita between Rabbi Meir, Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Yossi. In the time of the amoraim, there were different opinions about whether the betrothal money would be returned or whether other gifts given from the groom to the bride were to be returned.

The five unique laws that govern the shushbinot gifts. The court can enforce its collection. It is returned only when the one who gave first gets married. There is no interest if the reciprocal gift is larger than the first. It is not canceled in the shmita year like other loans. And a firstborn would not collect a double portion if the father was owed shushbinot gifts for his sons.

If one doesn't attend the wedding, one is still obligated to bring reciprocal gifts. However, if he was not invited to the wedding, while he still needs to pay, he can hold a grievance against the person. However, since he did not eat at the wedding, he can deduct the amount he would have eaten from his gift. How is the amount of the deduction calculated?

A braita sets up various cases in which one is not obligated to return the shushbinot. In the context of that braita, they mention a public wedding (pumbi) and therefore another braita that mentions this word pumbi in a different context is brought. That braita quotes various drashot comparing one who is wealthy in different types of property to one who is wealthy in different types of Torah knowledge. What is the ideal? Rav and Rava deliberation about whether it is better to master Mishna or better to matter Talmud. They each derive their opinion from Proverbs 15:15. Other drashot are brought on that verse which relate to middot or other things that will make a person happy or will cause them to lead an unhappy life. Some of these sources view having a happy life as a good thing whereas others do not view it in a positive light.

How are estate profits divided if only some or one of the heirs invested either time or money in improving it? What are the factors that affect the law? When are some exceptions to the rules?

It was customary that a father who married off his oldest son in a house adjacent to his own house, would give that house to the son as a gift. Since this was the generally accepted practice, even if the father didn't specify it as a gift to the son, the law presumes that the house was given to the son. This is one of three laws that are declared "A halakha without a clear explanation."

If brothers are living off the father's estate, in what situation would a brother's salary be shared with the other brothers? Are doctor bills for one of the heirs paid for by the estate? The Gemara differentiates between those who get sick because they brought it upon themselves and those who get sick due to circumstances beyond their control.

Reciprocal marriage gifts (which were common in those days and could be demanded in a court) - how are they divided among heirs? On what do those laws depend?

Today's daf is sponsored by Audrey Levant in honor of Geri Goldstein Geudalia's grandson, Moshe, on his bar mitzvah in Ottawa, Canada this Shabbat. 

In explaining why the commitment of the father to his son, "I will give you a portion with all your yet-to-be-born children" is ineffective, it is compared to one who says "Acquire it like a donkey." If one says to another, "You and a donkey shall acquire the item" is the kinyan effective? Rav Nachman holds that the person acquires half, Rav Hamnuna holds this is entirely ineffective and Rav Sheshet holds that the person acquires the entire item. Rav Sheshet brings a source regarding teruma to prove his position. However, this proof is rejected. Rav Avia brings a difficulty against those who were against Rav Sheshet's position from a case regarding a man who betrothed five women, two of whom could not be betrothed by him in this way as they were sisters (kiddushin that are not able to be consummated, shelo nimseru l'bia). Since the betrothal is effective to some, it can be compared to the "you and the donkey" case. However, this is also rejected as the case was misunderstood by Rav Avia and in fact, the man only had already excluded the sisters in the act of betrothal as he said, "Whoever is eligible to have relations with me will be betrothed." Therefore, the case is not similar at all to the donkey case.

If one says, I will give my wife and my sons my possessions, does she get 50% or an equal share with all the sons? Rav Yosef ruled that she receives half and proved it from a verse about the lechem hapanim (shewbread) being divided between Aharon and his sons, where Aharon received half. Abaye rejects the comparison and rules that she receives an equal share. This is questioned in light of rulings where rabbis granted the wife half, and a ruling of Rebbi regarding a division of taxes. However, the ruling of Rebbi is rejected as it is more similar to the case of Aharon and his sons, than to the case of the woman and her sons. A difficulty is raised against Rav Yosef's ruling from the laws regarding dividing up a large meal offering into two vessels. However, the comparison to the meal offering is rejected as well. The halakha is like Rav Yosef in this case and in two others previously cited in Bava Batra (Bava Batra 12b and Bava Batra 114a).

If one sends silk to his family, how is it divided between sons, daughters, and daughters-in-law? If one has one son and one daughter and promised his property to his "sons", does that wording include the daughter as well? If one has one son and a grandson and promises his property to his "sons" does that include his grandson?

When the estate is not yet divided and the older children invest the property, are the proceeds divided evenly between all the brothers or only the ones who invested? On what does it depend?

If one gives a gift to an unborn child, while it is a fetus, Rav Huna rules that the gift is not acquired. Rav Nachman holds that one can give a gift if they say, "I am giving this gift when the baby is born." Rav Sheshet holds that a fetus can acquire items in all cases and brings a braita to support his position. Abaye and Rava each provide different explanations for the ruling in braita to show that it does not necessarily prove Rav Sheshet's position. The Gemara brings a Mishna in Nidda 44a to reject Rav Sheshet's opinion. But this is dismissed as Rav Sheshet himself explained the Mishna as referring to a particular case, without ramifications for this debate. Another explanation of that Mishna is brought in the name of Rava can also resolve the difficulty raised against Rav Sheshet.

Rabbi Yochanan holds that in most situations, a gift given to an unborn fetus is not effective, but our Mishna is an exception to the rule as a father feels a closeness to an unborn child and it can therefore effectively transfer ownership of the gift to the fetus. The Gemara rules like Rabbi Yochanan.

A case is brought where a man promised his wife that the sons she would have with him in the future would inherit all of his property, excluding his sons from a previous wife. When the son of the other wife complained, the father promised him a portion with his future brothers. The rabbis were split about whether or not that son would receive an extra portion when the inheritance was later divided between him and the other sons. Those who hold he does not deserve an extra portion claim that the promise was that he would get a portion like his unborn brother, but since the father cannot give them a portion at that point, as they were unborn, the statement was meaningless.

Abaye and Rava disagreed on their understanding of the Mishna regarding the ruling of a tumtum who tries to collect money form a father's estate. A difficulty is raised against Abaye's explanation from a braita, but is resolved.

Why in the case of the Mishna did the husband commit 200 zuzim to his unborn child if she is a girl and 100 if he is a boy - wasn't there a preference in those days for male children, as per the words of Rabbi Yochanan in the name of Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai? Three answers are brought.

Two tannaitic sources are brought with cases similar to the ones in our Mishna but without enough details so the Gemara establishes the details of the cases discussed.

A case happened where a man on his deathbed promised all of his property to his unborn baby. Rav Huna ruled that this was ineffective as one cannot effect a transaction with someone who is not yet in existence, Rav Nachman questions this ruling from our Mishna where in all the cases the father promised money to an unborn child. Rav Huna rejects the Mishna saying, "I don't know who is the author of this Mishna!" The Gemara questions why Rav Huna couldn't have given a different answer. It raises seven possibilities but ultimately rejects them all.