In this episode, we discuss the problems associated with vague concepts in psychological science. We talk about the jingle-jangle fallacy, the trade-off between broad concepts and more precise concepts, if we should generate databases of conceptual definitions, and how the reward structures can get in the way of specifying concepts clearly.

Aikins, H. A. (1902). The principles of logic. H. Holt and Company. https://www.loc.gov/resource/gdcmassbookdig.principlesoflogi00aiki/

Chalmers, D. J. (2025). What is conceptual engineering and what should it be? Inquiry, 68(9), 2902–2919. https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2020.1817141 

Gerring, J. (1999). What Makes a Concept Good? A Criterial Framework for Understanding Concept Formation in the Social Sciences. Polity, 31(3), 357–393. https://doi.org/10.2307/3235246 

Hirsch, P. M., & Levin, D. Z. (1999). Umbrella Advocates Versus Validity Police: A Life-Cycle Model. Organization Science, 10(2), 199–212. https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.10.2.199 

Sartori, G. (1970). Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics. The American Political Science Review, 64(4), 1033–1053. https://doi.org/10.2307/1958356 

Thorndike, E. L. (Edward L. (with University of California Libraries). (1904). An introduction to the theory of mental and social measurements. New York : Science Press. http://archive.org/details/theoryofmentalso00thor

Truman Lee Kelley, (1927). Interpretation of education measurements. World book company. http://archive.org/details/bwb_P9-AQI-186

APA Dictionary of Psychology: https://dictionary.apa.org/ 

In this episode, we continue our discussion of scientism. We talk about 6 problems with scientism that have been raised by Susan Haack, if we should feel bad about having some sympathy for scientism, and whether the contributions of all scientifici disciplines deserved the label of 'knowledge'. Enjoy. 

References:

Haack, S. (2012). Six Signs of Scientism. Logos & Episteme, 3(1), 75–95. https://doi.org/10.5840/logos-episteme20123151

Brown, N. J. L., Sokal, A. D., & Friedman, H. L. (2013). The complex dynamics of wishful thinking: The critical positivity ratio. American Psychologist, 68(9), 801–813. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0032850

Peels, R. (2023). Scientism and scientific fundamentalism: What science can learn from mainstream religion. Interdisciplinary Science Reviews, 48(2), 395–410. https://doi.org/10.1080/03080188.2022.2152246

de Ridder, Jeroen. “Science and Scientism in Popular Science Writing.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 3, no. 12 (2014): 23-39. https://social-epistemology.com/2014/11/03/science-and-scientism-in-popular-science-writing-jeroen-de-ridder/ 

Meehl, P. E. (2004). Cliometric metatheory III: Peircean consensus, verisimilitude and asymptotic method. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 55(4), 615–643.

Mizrahi, M. (2017). What’s so bad about scientism? Social Epistemology, 31(4), 351–367. https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2017.1297505

Hayek, F. A. (1952). The Counter-Revolution of Science: Studies on the Abuse of Reason. Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press. 

Rulkens, C. C. S., Peels, R., Stols-Witlox, M., Meloni, S., Lechner, I. M., & Bouter, L. (2025). The attribution of two portraits of Rembrandt revisited: A replication study in art history. Humanities and Social Sciences Communications, 12(1), 1347. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-025-05523-2

In this two-part episode, we delve into the topic of scientism. Is science the best way to generate knowledge? Or are we giving too much deference to science if we believe this? In this first part, we discuss what scientism is, what - if anything - is wrong with scientism, and whether it is bad to be a scien-ti-sim-ist?

References:

Haack, S. (2012). Six Signs of Scientism. Logos & Episteme, 3(1), 75–95. https://doi.org/10.5840/logos-episteme20123151

Brown, N. J. L., Sokal, A. D., & Friedman, H. L. (2013). The complex dynamics of wishful thinking: The critical positivity ratio. American Psychologist, 68(9), 801–813. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0032850

Peels, R. (2023). Scientism and scientific fundamentalism: What science can learn from mainstream religion. Interdisciplinary Science Reviews, 48(2), 395–410. https://doi.org/10.1080/03080188.2022.2152246

de Ridder, Jeroen. “Science and Scientism in Popular Science Writing.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 3, no. 12 (2014): 23-39. https://social-epistemology.com/2014/11/03/science-and-scientism-in-popular-science-writing-jeroen-de-ridder/ 

Meehl, P. E. (2004). Cliometric metatheory III: Peircean consensus, verisimilitude and asymptotic method. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 55(4), 615–643.

Mizrahi, M. (2017). What’s so bad about scientism? Social Epistemology, 31(4), 351–367. https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2017.1297505

Hayek, F. A. (1952). The Counter-Revolution of Science: Studies on the Abuse of Reason. Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press. 

Rulkens, C. C. S., Peels, R., Stols-Witlox, M., Meloni, S., Lechner, I. M., & Bouter, L. (2025). The attribution of two portraits of Rembrandt revisited: A replication study in art history. Humanities and Social Sciences Communications, 12(1), 1347. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-025-05523-2

In this episode, we discuss "Is the scientific paper a fraud?" by Sir Peter Medawar. 

Shownotes

• Medawar, P. (1999). Is the scientific paper a fraud? Communicating Science: Professional Contexts, 27–31.
• Ross, G. R., Meloy, M. G., & Bolton, L. E. (2021). Disorder and downsizing. Journal of Consumer Research, 47(6), 959–977.
  • The footnote reads: "Like many consumers, we were inspired by Marie Kondo to declutter our homes—and also to conduct this research! Note that our work is not a test of the KonMari method per se but rather an investigation of ideas—on dis/order, waste aversion, and selection/rejection (as these quotes illustrate)—inspired by her writing and the surprising lack of research on downsizing."
• Karataş, M., & Cutright, K. M. (2023). Thinking about God increases acceptance of artificial intelligence in decision-making. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 120(33), e2218961120. 
• Richard Feynman on finding new laws

Medawar, P. (1999). Is the scientific paper a fraud? Communicating Science: Professional Contexts, 27–31.

In this episode, we try to make the concept of tacit knowledge explicit. How much of our scientific knowledge depends on knowledge that we can't communicate directly? How can we replicate studies, if they might rely on tacit knowledge? And why has the concept itself not been made more explicit in the last 45 years? Enjoy. 

Collins, H. (2012). Tacit and Explicit Knowledge. University of Chicago Press. https://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/T/bo8461024.html 

Franklin, A., & Collins, H. (2016). Two Kinds of Case Study and a New Agreement. In T. Sauer & R. Scholl (Eds.), The Philosophy of Historical Case Studies (pp. 95–121). Springer International Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-30229-4_6 

Polanyi, M. (1966). The Tacit Dimension. University of Chicago Press. https://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/T/bo6035368.html

Collins, H. M. (1975). The Seven Sexes: A Study in the Sociology of a Phenomenon, or the Replication of Experiments in Physics. Sociology, 9(2), 205–224. https://doi.org/10.1177/003803857500900202 

Gerholm, T. (1990). On Tacit Knowledge in Academia. European Journal of Education, 25(3), 263–271. https://doi.org/10.2307/1503316 

In this episode, we continue the discussion on p-hacking. Were the accusations of p-hacking valid? And how can one avoid said accusations? What are the reasons for p-hacking? And what are some solutions? 

Shownotes

• Giner-Sorolla, R. (2012). Science or art? How aesthetic standards grease the way through the publication bottleneck but undermine science. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 7(6), 562–571.
• Introduction to the Special Section on Research Practices (Barbara Spellman)

In this two-part episode, we delve into the phenomenon of p-hacking. What are the various terms used to describe practices that inflate error rates? How does terminology shape our understanding and bring about change?  What are its necessary and sufficient conditions, and which practices are most common? 

Shownotes

• Simonsohn, U., Nelson, L. D., & Simmons, J. P. (2014). P-curve: a key to the file-drawer. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 143(2), 534.
• Simmons, J. P., Nelson, L. D., & Simonsohn, U. (2011). False-positive psychology: Undisclosed flexibility in data collection and analysis allows presenting anything as significant. Psychological Science, 22(11), 1359-1366.
• Stefan, A. M., & Schönbrodt, F. D. (2023). Big little lies: A compendium and simulation of p-hacking strategies. Royal Society Open Science, 10(2), 220346.
• John, L. K., Loewenstein, G., & Prelec, D. (2012). Measuring the prevalence of questionable research practices with incentives for truth telling. Psychological Science, 23(5), 524-532.
• Fiedler, K., & Schwarz, N. (2016). Questionable research practices revisited. Social Psychological and Personality Science, 7(1), 45-52.

In this episode, we discuss unethical research. What are some examples of egregious violations of ethical guidelines? What are some more subtle ways in which research can be unethical?And what should we do with results obtained through unethical research?

Shownotes

• The Nuremberg Code
• The Declaration of Helsinki
• Three Identical Strangers
• The ethical implications of the "Monster Study"
• 'Little Albert' regains his identity
• Caplan, A. L. (2021). How should we regard information gathered in Nazi experiments?. AMA Journal of Ethics, 23(1), 55-58.
• Is it right to use Nazi research if it can save lives?