FS Credit Opportunities Corp. v. Saba Capital Master Fund | 12/10/25 | Docket #: 24-345 24-345 FS CREDIT CORP. V. SABA CAPITAL MASTER FUND, LTD. DECISION BELOW: 2024 WL 3174971 CERT. GRANTED 6/30/2025 QUESTION PRESENTED: The courts of appeals have split 2-1 over whether Congress created an implied private right of action in Section 47(b) of the Investment Company Act (ICA), which provides: (1) A contract that is made, or whose performance involves, a violation of this subchapter ... is unenforceable by either party .... (2) To the extent that a contract described in paragraph (1) has been performed, a court may not deny rescission at the instance of any party unless such court finds that under the circumstances the denial of rescission would produce a more equitable result than its grant and would not be inconsistent with the purposes of this subchapter. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-46(b)(1)-(2). The Third and Ninth Circuits, relying on statutory text and structure, hold that Section 47(b) does not create an implied private right of action, and a panel of the Fourth Circuit has agreed in an unpublished opinion. Only the Second Circuit-where plaintiffs may be able to sue most investment funds subject to the ICA, given New York's and the New York Stock Exchange's roles in financial operations- holds the opposite based on an "inference": parties may bring a lawsuit under Section 47(b), even though Congress never said so. The question presented is whether Section 47(b) of the ICA, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-46 (b), creates an implied private right of action. LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 23-8104, 24-79, 24-80, 24-82, 24-83, 24-116, 24-189

Hamm v. Smith | 12/10/25 | Docket #: 24-872 24-872 HAMM, COMMISSIONER AL DOC V. SMITH DECISION BELOW: 2024 WL 4793028 THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI IS GRANTED LIMITED TO THE FOLLOWING QUESTION: WHETHER AND HOW COURTS MAY CONSIDER THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF MULTIPLE IQ SCORES IN ASSESSING AN ATKINS CLAIM. CERT. GRANTED 6/6/2025 QUESTION PRESENTED: Like most States, Alabama requires that offenders prove an IQ of 70 or less to satisfy the intellectual-functioning prong of Atkins v. Virginia . This case was not close: Smith scored 75, 74, 72, 78, and 74 on five full-scale IQ tests. There is no way to conclude from these five numbers that Smith's true IQ is likely to be 70 or below. So the courts below required Smith to prove only that his IQ " could be " 70 and required the State to bring evidence "strong enough" to "foreclose" and "rule out the possibility" of intellectual disability. The first question presented is: 1. Whether, under a proper application of Atkins , a State can require a claimant to prove an IQ of 70 or less by a preponderance of the evidence. Evaluating multiple IQ scores is "complicated," and "this Court has not specified how" to do it. In the State's view, five scores are more accurate than one, and there are ways to account for that fact. The courts below disagree. The district court relied on Smith's 72 ± 3 to find that his IQ "could be" 69. On remand, the Eleventh Circuit's "holistic approach" asked whether Smith had scores of "about" 75 or less. Counting four out of five scores between 72 and 75, the court found "consistent evidence" that Smith "may" qualify as mildly disabled. Thus, the court "followed the law's requirement," in its view, to "move on" to Smith's adaptive deficits. The second question presented is: 2. Whether courts evaluating multiple IQ scores must find that every valid score of "about" 75 or less supports an Atkins claim. LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 21-14519

NRSC v. FEC | 12/09/25 | Docket #: 24-621 24-621 NRSC V. FEC DECISION BELOW: 117 F.4th 389 Order of July 1, 2025: ROMAN MARTINEZ, ESQUIRE, OF WASHINGTON, D. C., IS INVITED TO BRIEF AND ARGUE THIS CASE, AS AMICUS CURIAE , IN SUPPORT OF THE JUDGMENT BELOW. Order of December 5 , 2025 : THE MOTION OF COURT-APPOINTED AMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF THE JUDGMENT BELOW FOR LEAVE TO FILE A SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF IS GRANTED. CERT. GRANTED 6/30/2025 QUESTION PRESENTED: A political party exists to get its candidates elected. Yet Congress has severely restricted how much parties can spend on their own campaign advertising if done in cooperation with those very candidates. 52 U.S.C. § 30116(d). In an opinion by Chief Judge Sutton, a 10-judge majority of the en banc Sixth Circuit agreed that these so-called "coordinated party expenditure limits" stand in serious tension with recent First Amendment doctrine. App.10a-15a. It nevertheless upheld them as constitutional, both on their face and as applied to coordinated political advertising ("party coordinated communications"), believing the case to be controlled by FEC v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee , 533 U.S. 431 (2001) ( Colorado II ). In doing so, the majority acknowledged that in the 23 years since Colorado II , this Court "has tightened the free-speech restrictions on campaign finance regulation," that "tension has emerged between the reasoning of Colorado II and the reasoning of later decisions of the Court," and that relevant facts have "changed, most notably with 2014 amendments" to the limits and "the rise of unlimited spending by political action committees." App.3a-4a, 11a. But it thought "any new assessment of the validity of the limits" remained this Court's "province, not ours." App.14a-15a. The question presented is: Whether the limits on coordinated party expenditures in 52 U.S.C. § 30116 violate the First Amendment, either on their face or as applied to party spending in connection with "party coordinated communications" as defined in 11 C.F.R. § 109.37. LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 24-3051

Trump, President of United States v. Slaughter | 12/08/25 | Docket #: 25-332 25-332 TRUMP V. SLAUGHTER DECISION BELOW: THE APPLICATION FOR STAY PRESENTED TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE AND BY HIM REFERRED TO THE COURT IS GRANTED. THE JULY 17,2025 ORDER OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, NO. 25 – CV – 909 , ECF DOC. 52 , IS STAYED. THE APPLICATION IS ALSO TREATED AS A PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI BEFORE JUDGMENT, AND THE PETITION IS GRANTED.   THE STAY SHALL TERMINATE UPON THE SENDING DOWN OF THE JUDGMENT OF THIS COURT. EXPEDITED BRIEFING. CERT. GRANTED 9/22/2025 QUESTION PRESENTED: The parties are directed to brief and argue the following questions: (1) Whether the statutory removal protections for members of the Federal Trade Commission violate the separation of powers and, if so, whether Humphrey ’ s Executor v. United States , 295 U. S. 602 (1935), should be overruled. (2) Whether a federal court may prevent a person ’ s removal from public office, either through relief at equity or at law. LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 25-5261

Olivier v. City of Brandon | 12/03/25 | Docket #: 24-993 24-993 OLIVIER V. BRANDON, MS DECISION BELOW: 2023 WL 5500223 CERT. GRANTED 7/3/2025 QUESTION PRESENTED: Gabriel Olivier is a Christian who feels called to share the gospel with his fellow citizens. After being arrested and fined for violating an ordinance targeting "protests" outside a public amphitheater, Olivier brought a § 1983 suit under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to declare the ordinance unconstitutional and enjoin its enforcement against him in the future. The Fifth Circuit, applying its precedent construing this Court's decision in Heck v. Humphrey , 512 U.S. 477 (1994), held that Olivier's prior conviction barred his § 1983 suit because even the prospective relief it seeks would necessarily undermine his prior conviction. The Fifth Circuit acknowledged the "friction" between its decision and those of this Court and other circuits. Over vigorous dissents, the Fifth Circuit denied rehearing en banc by one vote. The questions presented are: 1. Whether, as the Fifth Circuit holds in conflict with the Ninth and Tenth Circuits, this Court's decision in Heck v. Humphrey bars § 1983 claims seeking purely prospective relief where the plaintiff has been punished before under the law challenged as unconstitutional. 2. Whether, as the Fifth Circuit and at least four others hold in conflict with five other circuits, Heck v. Humphrey bars § 1983 claims by plaintiffs even where they never had access to federal habeas relief. LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 22-60566

First Choice Women's Resource Centers v. Platkin | 12/02/25 | Docket #: 24-781 24-781 FIRST CHOICE WOMEN'S RESOURCE CENTERS, INC. V. PLATKIN DECISION BELOW: 2024 WL 5088105 CERT. GRANTED 6/16/2025 QUESTION PRESENTED: New Jersey's Attorney General served an investigatory subpoena on First Choice Women's Resource Centers, Inc., a faith-based pregnancy center, demanding that it turn over most of its donors' names. First Choice challenged the Subpoena under 42 U.S.C. 1983 in federal court, and the Attorney General filed a subsequent suit to enforce it in state court. The state court granted the Attorney General's motion to enforce the Subpoena but expressly did not decide First Choice's federal constitutional challenges. The Attorney General then moved in state court to sanction First Choice. Meanwhile, the district court held that First Choice's constitutional claims were not ripe in federal court. The Third Circuit affirmed in a divided per curiam decision. Judge Bibas would have held the action ripe as indistinguishable from . Americans for Prosperity Foundation v. Banta , 594 U.S. 595, 618-19 (2021). But the majority concluded First Choice's claims were not yet ripe because First Choice could litigate its constitutional claims in state court. In doing so, the majority followed the rule of the Fifth Circuit and split from the Ninth Circuit. It did not address the likely loss of a federal forum once the state court rules on the federal constitutional issues. The question presented is: Where the subject of a state investigatory demand has established a reasonably objective chill of its First Amendment rights, is a federal court in a first-filed action deprived of jurisdiction because those rights must be adjudicated in state court? LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 24-3124

Urias-Orellana v. Bondi, Att'y Gen. | 12/01/25 | Docket #: 24-777 24-777 URIAS-ORELLANA V. BONDI DECISION BELOW: 121 F.4th 327 CERT. GRANTED 6/30/2025 QUESTION PRESENTED: The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) provides that noncitizens on American soil are generally eligible for asylum if they qualify as a "refugee." 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1) (A). A refugee is someone with "a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion." Id. § 1101(a)(42). Noncitizens are presumptively eligible for asylum if they have "suffered persecution in the past." 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1). If ordered removed by an immigration judge (IJ), noncitizens may appeal the removal order-and with it, the denial of asylum-to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). From there, "judicial review" is available in "an appropriate court of appeals." 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5). The INA mandates judicial deference on "findings of fact" and three other kinds of administrative decisions. Id. § 1252(b)(4). The statute also explicitly provides for judicial review of the BIA's decisions on "questions of law," but does not establish a deferential standard of review for such decisions. Id. § 1252(a)(2)(D), (b)(9). The question presented is: Whether a federal court of appeals must defer to the BIA's judgment that a given set of undisputed facts does not demonstrate mistreatment severe enough to constitute "persecution" under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42). LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 24-1042

Cox Communications v. Sony Music Entertainment | 12/01/25 | Docket #: 24-171 24-171 COX COMMUNICATIONS, INC. V. SONY MUSIC ENTERTAINMENT DECISION BELOW: 93 F.4th 222 CERT. GRANTED 6/30/2025 QUESTION PRESENTED: 1. This Court has held that a business commits contributory copyright infringement when it "distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps to foster infringement." Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster , Ltd ., 545 U.S. 913, 919 (2005). The courts of appeals have split three ways over the scope of that ruling, developing differing standards for when it is appropriate to hold an online service provider secondarily liable for copyright infringement committed by users. Did the Fourth Circuit err in holding that a service provider can be held liable for "materially contributing" to copyright infringement merely because it knew that people were using certain accounts to infringe and did not terminate access, without proof that the service provider affirmatively fostered infringement or otherwise intended to promote it? 2. Generally, a defendant cannot be held liable as a willful violator of the law-and subject to increased penalties-without proof that it knew or recklessly disregarded a high risk that its own conduct was illegal. In conflict with the Eighth Circuit, the Fourth Circuit upheld an instruction allowing the jury to find willfulness if Cox knew its subscribers ' conduct was illegal-without proof Cox knew its own conduct in not terminating them was illegal. Did the Fourth Circuit err in holding that mere knowledge of another's direct infringement suffices to find willfulness under 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)? LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 21-1168

Rutherford v. United States | 11/12/25 | Docket #: 24-820 24-820 RUTHERFORD V. UNITED STATES DECISION BELOW: 120 F.4th 360 CONSOLIDATED FOR ONE HOUR ORAL ARGUMENT WITH 24-860 CERT. GRANTED 6/6/2025 QUESTION PRESENTED: The compassionate-release statute permits courts to reduce a prisoner's sentence if the court finds that "extraordinary and compelling reasons" warrant relief. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). Congress placed only two limits on what can count as an "extraordinary and compelling reason": (1) it must be "consistent with" "applicable policy statements" from the U.S. Sentencing Commission, id .; and (2) "[r]ehabilitation of the defendant alone shall not be considered an extra- ordinary and compelling reason," 28 U.S.C. § 994(t). Sections 401 and 403 of the First Step Act of 2018 reduced penalties for certain drug and firearm offenses going forward. Because of these changes, individuals sentenced today for these offenses often face mandatory minimum terms of imprisonment decades shorter than they would have received before the First Step Act. The question presented is: Whether, as four circuits permit but six others prohibit, a district court may consider disparities created by the First Step Act's prospective changes in sentencing law when deciding if "extraordinary and compelling reasons" warrant a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 23-1904

Fernandez v. United States | 11/12/25 | Docket #: 24-556 24-556 FERNANDEZ V. UNITED STATES DECISION BELOW: 104 F.4th 420 THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI IS GRANTED LIMITED TO THE FOLLOWING QUESTION: WHETHER A COMBINATION OF “ EXTRAORDINARY AND COMPELLING REASONS ” THAT MAY WARRANT A DISCRETIONARY SENTENCE REDUCTION UNDER 18 U. S. C. §3582(c)(1)(A) CAN INCLUDE REASONS THAT MAY ALSO BE ALLEGED AS GROUNDS FOR VACATUR OF A SENTENCE UNDER 28 U. S. C. §2255.   CERT. GRANTED 5/27/2025 QUESTION PRESENTED: Under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), a district court has broad discretion to reduce the term of imprisonment in any case if it finds that "extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction." The sole limitation Congress placed on that discretion is found in 18 U.S.C. § 994(t), which provides that "[r]ehabilitation of the defendant alone shall not be considered an extraordinary and compelling reason." In reversing the district court's grant of compassionate release to Joe Fernandez, the Second Circuit held that it was an abuse of discretion for the court to have considered evidence bearing on Fernandez's potential innocence as well to have found a disparity in sentences between Fernandez and several of his co-defendants who were cooperating witnesses. That decision was contrary to decisions of the First and Ninth Circuits, which have each held that district courts are not restricted with respect to matters they may consider under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) other than as set forth by Congress. The question presented is: Whether the Second Circuit erred in recognizing extra-textual limitations on what information a court may consider when determining whether there exist extraordinary and compelling reasons warranting a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1) (A). LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 22-3122

GEO Group, Inc. v. Menocal | 11/10/25 | Docket #: 24-758 24-758 THE GEO GROUP, INC. V. MENOCAL DECISION BELOW: 2024 WL 4544184 CERT. GRANTED 6/2/2025 QUESTION PRESENTED: Under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, the courts of appeals "have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts." This Court has held that certain orders are immediately appealable under Section 1291 even though they do not terminate the litigation. Such "collateral orders" include orders denying claims of absolute immunity, qualified immunity, and state sovereign immunity. The question presented, which has divided the circuit courts 5-3, is whether an order denying a government contractor's claim of derivative sovereign immunity is immediately appealable under the collateral-order doctrine. LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 22-1409