In late 2023, a few weeks after the start of the war in Gaza, the United Nations Security Council was at odds over how to respond. Any one of the council’s permanent members can veto a resolution—and they often do when it comes to issues related to Israel and Palestine. 

Malta’s Vanessa Frazier held one of the nine rotating seats on the council. Over the course of several weeks, Frazier came up with a bridging approach that focused on pausing the fighting to allow civilians to access food and other necessities—without mentioning the word “cease-fire.” Her resolution didn’t end the war. But it did lead to the release of some Israeli hostages in exchange for Palestinian prisoners.

The Negotiators is a podcast from Foreign Policy and Doha Debates—and a special partner this season, the International Peace Institute.

For decades, the FSO Safer had been used to store oil off the coast of Yemen. But when the Houthis took control of the capital city of Sanaa in 2014, the government-owned tanker was suddenly located in Houthi-controlled territory. The tanker fell into disrepair, and by 2022, there was a real concern that the vessel could sink, releasing more than a million barrels of oil into the Red Sea.

David Gressly was the U.N. humanitarian coordinator for Yemen, and his job was to provide support to the 13 million people who needed humanitarian assistance. But late one night, David got a call from his bosses in New York, asking him to do something many felt was impossible—getting the Houthis and the Yemeni government to agree on a plan to transfer the oil off the FSO Safer. 

The Negotiators is a podcast from Foreign Policy and Doha Debates—and a special partner this season, the International Peace Institute.

When the International Criminal Court was established in 1998, the crime of aggression was identified as the supreme international crime. But countries couldn’t come to an agreement on how the crime would be defined or how the court would exercise its jurisdiction. There simply wasn’t enough time.

Those questions were revisited 12 years later, in Kampala, Uganda. Host Femi Oke talks to Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein, the chair of the working group on the crime of aggression, about how he used time pressure and a pep talk from legendary Nuremberg prosecutor Ben Ferencz to bridge political divisions among the negotiating parties and help them reach consensus. 

The Negotiators is a podcast from Foreign Policy and Doha Debates—and a special partner this season, the International Peace Institute.

The Negotiators is back with a new host and all new stories from some of the world's most dramatic negotiations. Journalist Femi Oke takes us behind the scenes at a luxury resort in Uganda, as government representatives gather to establish the International Criminal Court's jurisdiction to prosecute leaders for unjust wars. We'll go scuba diving through endangered coral reefs in the Red Sea with the environment minister of the Maldives, as she attempts to sway US Climate Envoy John Kerry. And we'll take a peek inside the negotiations for the ceasefire between Israel and Hamas that ended the war in Gaza – with one of the Qatari officials who helped make it happen.The Negotiators returns December 1, from Foreign Policy and Doha Debates -- and our special partner this season, the International Peace Institute. 

Since taking power, the Taliban have cracked down on human rights and deprived Afghan women and girls of fundamental freedoms. The outlook for productive engagement is dim. Yet there may have been a window, in the early months after the fall of the republic, to do things differently. Researcher Ashley Jackson speaks to aid workers and activists involved in direct negotiations with the Taliban as well as representatives from the U.S. and Taliban governments. And she takes a look at two intertwined questions: What might have been done differently then? And what should, or could, be done now?

Once it became clear that U.S. troops were leaving Afghanistan, the situation on the ground turned to panic. In August 2021, radio reporter Shirin Jaafari found herself in the middle of the effort to find safe passage for Najiba Noor, a 27-year-old Afghan policewoman who was the target of threats and harassment by the Taliban. For this episode, Shirin reconnects with Noor and speaks with other people directly involved in Digital Dunkirk—a mostly online, grassroots effort to help vulnerable Afghans get to safety.

When a diplomatic deal goes bad, the blame usually falls on the politicians. Often, we don’t even remember the names of the negotiators. But in the wake of the return of the Taliban, a lot of people have blamed one man: Zalmay Khalilzad, the U.S. special representative for Afghanistan reconciliation. Khalilzad was born in Afghanistan but had served in the U.S. government since the 1980s. He was at Bonn, and he later served as the U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan, Iraq, and the United Nations. Khalilzad sat down with reporter Andrew North to discuss what went wrong—and right—during the negotiations for peace in Afghanistan.

As soon as the Doha Agreement was signed, the clock started counting down to May 1, 2021—the day the United States had agreed to withdraw all troops. That gave the Afghan Republic and the Taliban 14 months to negotiate a power-sharing deal. That’s not a lot of time, even under the best of circumstances. Afghan American reporter Ali Latifi has an insider’s look at how friction within Afghan President Ashraf Ghani’s administration delayed and derailed the negotiations. But there’s enough blame to go around, with the Taliban playing a waiting game and Washington refusing to intervene.

As a candidate for the U.S. presidency, Donald Trump vowed to end the war in Afghanistan. But seven months after his inauguration, he changed his mind, saying that the United States should “fight to win.”

A year later, with the Taliban controlling or contesting more territory than at any point since 2001, representatives from the Trump administration traveled to Doha, Qatar, to open direct negotiations with the Taliban. Finalized in February 2020, the Doha agreement was hailed by the Taliban as a victory. The Afghan government called it a historic betrayal.

Veteran Middle East correspondent Sebastian Walker has the story.

By 2006, the United States and the Afghan Republic had been fighting the Taliban for five years. Neither side was poised to win. That’s when U.S. political scientist Barnett Rubin received a phone call from a Taliban intermediary that would mark the beginning of a four-year, clandestine process of “talks about talks”—even as fighting was intensifying on the ground and as U.S. troops found and killed Osama bin Laden in Pakistan. Veteran Afghanistan reporter Andrew North talks to some of the key players involved for a behind-the-scenes look at the negotiations.

All manner of the rich and powerful have passed through the doors of the mountaintop Hotel Petersberg in Bonn, Germany. But perhaps never as motley a cast as the one that arrived on November 27, 2001 to negotiate an end to the wars in Afghanistan. Warlords, exiled monarchists, intellectuals, and enemies so fierce, some had already been trying to kill each other for decades. But a key element was missing; The Taliban was not invited. Australian Iranian investigative journalist and author Soraya Lennie got the story from some of the negotiators who were in the room.