Exchange rate exposure of firms diminishes when imported intermediates and exports are denominated in currencies that move together. Appreciations of the domestic currency, raising foreign currency export prices, then also reduce marginal costs, allowing firms to counter the increase in foreign prices. Using firm-level data from seven European countries I estimate a structural model showing how exchange rate pass-through into sales depends on intermediate imports and the co-movement of export and import related exchange rates. I find that operational hedging requires firms to intentionally choose export and import regions with comoving currencies. Analyzing the locational choice of firms confirms that the co-movement of currencies indeed appears to be taken into consideration

We study how foreign competition affects the composition of investments inside firms. A parsimonious model predicts that firms have an incentive to shift their investments towards more short-term assets when exposed to tougher competition. Using data on expenditures of listed US companies into various asset classes with different lifespans, we document empirical evidence that is consistent with this prediction. Over a fifteen year period between 1995 and 2009, the rise in import competition is associated with a reduction of the firm-specific asset lifespan by about 4.5% on average. We additionally exploit the Chinese WTO accession as an exogenous shock in firm expectations about future exposure to competition.

Hans Albert hat in einigen Arbeiten den apriorischen Charakter des „neoklassischen Denkstils” kritisiert und treffend als „Modellplatonismus” bezeichnet. Die apriorische Denkhaltung findet sich aber nicht nur in der von Albert kritisierten Neoklassik, sondern vielleicht noch ausgeprägterer bei vielen modellfeindlichen Theoretikern, wie etwa den Österreichern, den Ordnungstheoretikern, den Vertretern der „constitutional economics” oder manchen neueren Vertretern der sozialen Marktwirtschaft. Es erscheint mir deshalb sinnvoll, dem Begriff „Modellplatonismus” den Begriff „Ordnungsplatonismus” an die Seite zu stellen. Die folgenden Bemerkungen sollen diese Kritik etwas erläutern.

The lack of coordination in the resolution of multinational banks has led to demands for the increased centralization of resolution regimes. However, as this paper argues, the anticipation of resolution procedures affects the incentives of host countries to impose capital standards on their resident banks. Critically, it is shown that overall welfare can even be decreased by introducing a centralized resolution regime without fully centralizing capital requirements. As, in the aftermath of the financial crisis, only countries that are not part of a supranational resolution regime unilaterally and significantly increased the capital requirements for their largest resident banks, this paper can help to understand and study the heterogeneity of the observed regulatory approaches.

This paper examines how IT influences global sourcing decisions. It develops a theoretical model to study how IT determines the decisions of firms located in the high-wage North whether to offshore production to a low-wage country in the South. Offshoring to South however is subject to costly communication reflected by partially incomplete contracting. More sophisticated IT allows more efficient communication between the Northern headquarter and its Southern intermediate input supplier and alleviates contractual frictions. The model provides several predictions about the impact of IT on the organization of the global supply chain. Complex industries for which codifiability and verifiability of information is a much harder task, are more likely to source intermediate inputs in countries with more efficient IT infrastructure. Considering the mode of firm organization, more efficient IT infrastructure is expected to reduce the share of intra-firm trade in more complex industries. These predictions are examined and validated using disaggregated industry-level trade data. Most importantly, these findings are robust to controlling for well-known sources of comparative advantage and determinants of firm organization such as factor endowments, financial development and contract enforcement.

By introducing controlled-foreign-company (CFC) rules, the parent country of a multinational firm reserves the right to tax the income of the firm's foreign affiliates if the tax rate in the affiliate's host country is below a specified threshold. We identify the conditions under which binding CFC rules are part of the optimal tax mix when governments can set the statutory tax rate, a thin capitalization rule and the CFC rule. We also analyze the effects of economic and financial integration on the optimal policy mix. Our results correspond to the actual development of anti-avoidance rules in OECD countries.

We investigate with German data how the use of temporary agency work has helped establishments to manage the economic and financial crisis in 2008/09. We examine the (regular) workforce development, use of short-time work, and business performance of establishments that made differential use of temporary agency work prior to the crisis. Overall, our results suggest that establishments with a greater use of temporary agency work coped better with the sharp decline in demand and made less frequent use of government-sponsored short-time work schemes.

Evidence from studies in international relations, the politics of reform, collective action and price competition suggests that economic agents in social dilemma situations cooperate more to avoid losses than in the pursuit of gains. To test whether the prospect of losses can induce cooperation, we let experimental subjects play the traveler’s dilemma in the gain and loss domain. Subjects cooperate substantially more over losses. Our experimental design allows us to show that this treatment effect is best explained by reference-dependent risk preferences and referencedependent strategic sophistication. We discuss policy implications and relate our findings to other experimental games played in the loss domain.

Several countries have recently introduced national capital standards exceeding the internationally coordinated Basel III rules, thus suggesting a `race to the top' in capital standards. We study regulatory competition when banks are heterogeneous and give loans to firms that produce output in an integrated market. In this setting capital requirements change the pool quality of banks in each country and inflict negative externalities on neighboring jurisdictions by shifting risks to foreign taxpayers and by reducing total credit supply and output. Non-cooperatively set capital standards are higher than coordinated ones when governments care equally about bank profits, taxpayers, and consumers.

One possible determinant of overpricing on asset markets is a lack of self-control abilities of traders. Self-control is the individual capacity to override or inhibit undesired behavioral tendencies such as impulses and to refrain from acting on them. We implement the first experiment that is able to address a potential causal relationship between self-control abilities and systematic overpricing on financial markets by introducing an exogenous variation of self-control abilities. Our experimental conditions seek to detect some of the channels through which individual self-control problems could transmit into irrational exuberance on the aggregate level. We observe a strong effect of inhibited self-control abilities on market overpricing. Our findings are furthermore robust to reducing self-control abilities only for a moderate share of traders in a market. Low self-control traders engage in more speculative behavior early on, but because others imitate their trading patterns, they do not end up earning less and are not driven out of the market.

This paper explores how reduced self-control affects individual investment behavior in two laboratory tasks. For this purpose, I exogenously reduce subjects’ self-control using a well-established psychological treatment. In each task, I find no significant main treatment effect, but secondary effects consistent with findings on self-control from other studies and self-control’s potential relevance in financial markets. In experiment 1, I find no significant change in the disposition effect following the manipulation. However, treated participants trade fewer different shares per round. In experiment 2, I look at the effect of self-control on myopic loss aversion by implementing a 2×2 design by varying investment horizon and self-control in a repeated lottery environment. Average behavior suggests that reduced self-control increases framing effects, but I cannot reject the null hypothesis of equal investment levels between the self-control treatments within each investment frame. Analyzing the dynamics of decision making in more detail, self-control depleted participants in the narrow frame reduce their investment levels on average over time which seems to be driven by more intense reactions to investment experiences.